Atomic Bombs on Japan - Unnecessary, or Even a War Crime?

Sorry, but I utterly disagree. Full disclosure: if not for the sudden end to the war in the Pacific, unforeseeable without the use of the atomic bomb, I probably wouldn't even be writing this. My father narrowly escaped death off Okinawa, where his lightly-armed, unarmored, and highly vulnerable merchant ship was repeatedly targeted by kamikaze attacks. When the war ended, he was scheduled to return to the Pacific, where the Japanese had five times as many kamikaze attacks readied - Allied planners estimated that 1/3 to 1/2 of the invasion force could be lost before landing.

The last straw was not Soviet attacks against the Japanese army occupying Manchuria, which was not considered a core part of the Japanese Empire. Starting in 1942, most of the Japanese army in Manchuria had been transferred to fight the US; what remained was raw recruits, understrength and poorly equipped. Indeed, in his speech announcing surrender, Emperor Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings, but not once to the Soviet attack, a view he repeated to General MacArthur in September 1945.

I am at the forefront of those calling for further sharp reductions in American (and other states') nuclear weapons. I am proud to be considered a member of the US delegation that negotiated the New START Treaty, which cut the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and their launchers for both the US and Russia. I am proud of the work I did to push for a treaty ending production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (Pakistan continues to block work on such an agreement.) . I have written both of my Senators, and my Congressman, urging them to support the P5+1 Iran deal. I have made my support for that deal very public. I even question whether US interests in the Pacific and Asia were of a such a degree as to risk provoking war with Japan (my internal jury is still out on that one). But I do not let my strong, unshakeable stance against the continued construction and possession of nuclear weapons blind me to their great utility in ending the horrors that would have ensued had World War II been prosecuted after August 1945.

Iran Deal: SEN Chuck Schumer Demands a Unicorn

Senator Chuck Schumer (D - NY) has stated he will oppose the P5+1 deal halting and rolling back efforts by Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. https://medium.com/@SenSchumer/my-position-on-the-iran-deal-e976b2f13478  Why? Well, centrally he says: "First, inspections are not “anywhere, anytime” and "Even more troubling is the fact that the U.S. cannot demand inspections unilaterally. "

That's right, Senator, Iran is not going to let foreign inspectors walk into ANY location in Iran, at ANY time, at the sole say-so and direction of its chief global opponent. What country, not prostrate after a total war, would allow that? You, sir, have asked for a unicorn. Under the deal, the IAEA inspections are extremely rigorous, more so than in any other country. Real arms control experts have said it is nearly impossible for Iran to have a nuclear weapons program under this deal. http://www.vox.com/2015/7/15/8967147/iran-nuclear-deal-jeffrey-lewis  The level of inspections demanded by Schumer are unneccessary and tantamount to granting the CIA an open door into the entire Iranian government, economy, and society. After the 1953 CIA-backed coup, the Iranians would never agree to that.

Senator Schumer's standards for the key goals under this agreement are fanciful. He might as well ask for a unicorn.

Book Review: Dark Invasion - 1915: Germany's Secret War and the Hunt for the First Terrorist Cell in America

Well, the sub-title tells you all you need to know about the subject of the book. The title plays off that of the memoirs of one of the German saboteurs, Dark Invader. Howard Blum's tale is compelling, and reads like an action-adventure novel, only it all happened. Murder, disguise, espionage, sabotage, suicide, attempted assassination of a powerful NY banker, rebellion, war in Mexico, WMD, detective stake-outs and chases, high-level briefings of the US President - it's all here. And it's history, not fiction.

As a story, Dark Invasion is gripping. As history, this well-researched account is even more compelling. In setting out the extensive, notorious and scandalous efforts of German diplomats, agents, and disgracefully not a few dual-nationals to violently block shipments from the "neutral" US to Britain and France in their war with Germany, Blum underscores an often overlooked motivation for America's entry into the Great War - German provocations, which even President Wilson ultimately found too much to withstand.

Blum's focus on Tom Tierney, the NYPD detective trying to halt Germany's attacks on allied shipping in his home town and harbor, is an effective device.  Tierney reminded me of Jack Ryan, but I'd rather have Tierney on my side than Ryan any day.

Book Review: White Eagles over Serbia, by Lawrence Durrell

Durrell was posted at the British Embassy in Belgrade from 1948 to 1952. It is from that experience that he gathered his background for White Eagles over Serbia, an entrancing realistic spy thriller from 1957 set in the time of Durrell's service in Yugoslavia. As a fellow ex-pat who served in the (former) Yugoslavia for six years, if at a later time, Durrell's narrative rings true. I wish to avoid spoilers, as this short (by current standards) tale moves briskly, alternating adventure and narrative, and should be read by any fan of Fleming, Forsyth, Le Carre, Ludlum and the like.

Book Review: A Mad Catastrophe - The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Hapsburg Empire

Geoffrey Wawro's book is a useful addition to the literature on the outbreak of World War One. The first quarter of the book examines how Austria entered the war with such a weak force; man for man, perhaps the weakest of any combatant. Wawro argues that it was Hungarian obstinacy, facilitated by the 1867 Compromise, itself supported by Bismarck who was keen to guard against Austrian schemes of revenge for their 1866 humiliation at the hands of Prussia. Penny-pinching led to shortages of rifles, machine guns, artillery and shells, and low pay for officers, leading to mediocre leadership.

It's a convincing argument, reading the remainder of the book, as general after general, most notably the army's leader, the inept and maudlin Chief of Staff Conrad, "lead" their troops from comfortable chateaus far, far to the rear. Three (!) invasions of Serbia in 1914, which had armed the assassins of the Austrian emperor's heir, were thrown back with heavy losses on both sides. There, as against Russia, only German intervention stabilized the front.

I found the successive accounts of military debacle after debacle exhausting and repetitive. But think of those who fought in them!

I do wish that Wawro had spent more time on the "why" of Austrian decision-making, both in politics before the war and militarily after July 1914. Wawro explicates the July crisis as quickly as he can, and falls into the trap of calling the ultimatum "degrading," mischaracterizing the key point as calling for Austrian officials to "lead an inquiry (on Serbian soil)" into the assassination - the ultimatum in fact calls for the cooperation and participation of Austria in Serbian led actions. But for Wawro's book, this is a sidelight, and thus a more excusable error than in some other accounts.

The maps included are useful, and the photographs add welcome interest.

Book Review: The Famine Plot, by Tim Pat Coogan

"The Almighty, indeed, sent the potato blight, but the English created the Famine." 

John Mitchel, 1861. 

Mitchel was "transported" (exiled) to Bermuda for 14 years for speaking the truth. Tim Pat Coogan will suffer no such fate for writing: "The Famine Plot; England's Role in Ireland's Greatest Tragedy." In America, he will suffer worse: the vast majority will never hear of, let alone read, his book. Of those of who do, almost all will view it as either a tale of "Olde Tyme Irelande" or as a political critique of, and only pertaining to, early Victorian England.

Coogan makes a well-researched, well-argued case for Mitchel's aphorism. Moreover, the faults of London's politicians and bureaucrats persist today, whenever government exploits tragedy to advance narrow, ideological, and partisan goals at the expense of ordinary citizens and in favor of the wealthy elite. It is a case history that Coogan's book can best assist our understanding of present day political culture.

The English Government, particularly after Russell succeeded Peel as Prime Minister in June 1847, put forward a number of reasons why it would not relieve Ireland's distress - even though Ireland, de jure, was an integral part of the so-called United Kingdom. I will summarize Coogan's arguments, which he includes as part of his chronological assessment, instead by topics.

Capitalism

Most Irish farmers were tenants, farming plots rented from often absentee landlords. Those landlords believed (often rightly) that they could receive more money if the small farms were extinguished, and the land use for "big farming" - cattle and export crops. The famine, though death and emigration, accomplished their goals.

Laissez faire economics

Prime Russel's Whigs were great proponents of laissez faire economics and the philosophies of Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus. So much so, they opposed food assistance as it would lower the price received by merchants. Nor was thought given to retaining food in Ireland - food exports continued in accordance with "sacrosanct" contracts. When at last public work programs were put in place, the roads were built in wildernesses -- "Boithre an ocrais (roads of hunger)" (p. 109), to not give private road builders competition.

Opposition to Government Welfare

Only with great reluctance did Russell's government provide welfare, and usually only under limited and demeaning circumstances, namely the infamous Dickensian workhouses.  Coogan cites England's senior bureaucrat (Trevelyan) as asserting that any wages paid for public works should be lower the prevailing wage, and only enough to keep away starvation. (p. 108) Recipients of welfare were to be destitute, devoid of even the smallest plot of land on which subsistence could be made. The governing philosophy was that poor relief (welfare) must be "penal and repulsive" - Treveleyan again. (p. 117), ignoring the overcrowded and diseased conditions of the workhouse that prevailed in reality. Instead, the Whigs and their favorite newspaper, The Times (of London) imagined as late as 1848, after a million Irish had died or emigrated in "coffin ships" that the Irish "are sitting idle at home, basking in the sun, telling stories, going to fairs, plotting, rebelling, wishing death to the Saxon," all born "on the shoulders of the hard working" Englishman (p. 213).

Racism

Coogan does not spare his readers the racist epithets of the English leadership, wherein such lights of the Victorian age as Disraeli, Punch magazine, and many others lesser known to an American audience compared the Irish to apes and rats. In a passage reminiscent of W's "they hate our freedoms," Disraeli proclaimed, "The Irish hate our order, our civilization, our enterprising industry, our pure religion." (p. 57)

Austerity

Coogan underscores as well the objection of HMG to relief on the grounds of government expense. It is somewhat difficult to parse from Coogan what would have been the expense of a responsive plan, one that would have spared the Irish from the famine. It appears, however, to be on the scale of 15 million pounds - roughly the UK's annual defense budget, or 1/4th the total financial cost to the UK of its wholly unnecessary and thoroughly unproductive prosecution of the Crimean war ten years after the Famine.

Conclusion

There is much, much more in Coogan's magnificent book, and I whole-heartedly recommend to anyone interested in Irish history, English politics, or political behavior and philosophy in general.

Book Review: The Lost History of 1914

Jack Beatty has taken a hard look at the "inevitability" of World War One, and deftly refuted the argument. The core of his book is the first six chapters, each looking at one of the major combatant countries and how close each came to NOT entering onto military action in Europe in 1914 (or 1917). The six are Germany, Russia, England, United States, Austria-Hungary, and France.  

The most interesting arguments are those on England, the US, and France. As any serious scholar of England knows, until the very last days of July 1914, it looked far more likely that the British Expeditionary Force would go to Ireland, as civil war broke out between Protestants and Catholics over Home Rule, than to France in the wake of Germany's attack through Belgium. 

If not for a nationalist editor publishing scandalous but true accounts of the skirt-chasing Minister of Finance, Joseph Callaux, Mme Callaux would have no cause to shoot and kill the newspaperman - derailing her husband's otherwise easy electoral victory and appointment as Prime Minister. With the renowned Jean Jaures as his foreign minister, and Callaux's track record of successfully mollifying German demands, it is unlikely that war on the western front would have broken out.

The most fascinating chapter is on the US, as Beatty underscores the anti-imperialist stance of President Wilson, and his break with the Taft policy of supporting Mexico's dictator, the favorite of Wall Street. Beatty shows how Wilson's motives in landing troops in Veracruz, Mexico in April 1914 was to support the rebels, by blocking arm shipments to the president of Mexico - but the fact of American troops on Mexican soil was portrayed as renewed imperialism. Provoked by Villa's 1916 raid on Columbus, NM, Wilson sent General Pershing on a wild-goose chase after the rebel formerly supported by Wilson. The renewed presence of American troops on Mexican soil prompted closer ties between Mexico and Imperial Germany, culminating in the disastrous Zimmermann telegram of 1917, promising Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to be restored to Mexico. Beatty argues that the telegram was even more decisive than the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare against American merchant ships in generating a fever for war in the heartland.

There is much more in Beatty's book; I have not even touched on the last four chapters, covering the last months of 1914, as the spade replaces the machine gun as the key instrument of war.  Beatty's book is well-written, and well worth the time and attention of anyone interested in how the war could have been avoided.