What We Have Here is a Failure to … Negotiate

My feeds are full of items from activists advocating for various goals, from electoral reform, vaccine “equity,” legal marijuana, police reform, environmental protection, and so on. Most all of them are variations on the line of “This is THE RIGHT THING TO DO” and pretty much stop there. Since most of them are just asking for money from people who already side with them, that's ok. As far as it goes. But then they take that same stance into enunciating the policy into real-world results... and wonder why they stall out miserably.

Let's back up and look at their pitch: equity, justice, reform … THE RIGHT THING TO DO. But no one – NO ONE – thinks they're the bad guys. If you don't think you're the bad guy, you probably think you are already doing the right thing. If the “other side” really wants you to change your position, they have to do (at least) one of two things: convince you are in the wrong, or make it worth your while to accept their proposal.

Can the other side be convinced they're wrong? Maybe. But there is a reason why this is also know as the “Road to Damascus” moment, a miraculous occurrence: it's awfully rare, and takes the equivalent of divine intervention. I exaggerate, somewhat, for effect. You have countervailing examples: Secretary of Defense Perry, formerly in charge of the US nuclear weapons arsenal, who ten years after he left office joined with former Secretaries of State Shultz (RIP) and Kissinger, and former Senator Nunn to call for the US to take the lead in reducing and abolishing those weapons.* The four became convinced that under the changed circumstances of the end of the Cold War, only a radical change in the US stance could enhance American and global safety and security. But many Americans and much of the US Senate is stuck in the past.

Some (many?) will object to the other route - make it worth while to accept the proposal. That's … “compromise.” Even dictionary.com defines that as “to jeopardize,” and “to make a dishonorable or shameful concession.” The urban dictionary has in second place “In marriage – an amiable arrangment between husband and wife whereby they agree to let her have her own way.” In fourth: “compromise is when nobody gets what they wanted.” Sixth: An agreement between two or more political parties in which one attempts to be reasonable and the other agrees to whine until they get everything they want under the pretense that the other party or parties are not, in fact compromising.”

Let's skip over those to the top-rated entry at urbandictionary.com: “A beautiful way to solve the issues and problems through straight-forward conversation.”

How can we use that definition to reach sufficient consensus to adopt policy recommendations so as to change the real world around us? Oddly enough, the answer is in the self-same social media channels. But not the messages from advocates; rather, let's look at the ones trying to literally sell us something, asking us to exchange our cash for what they have on offer. They are trying to make it worth our while - to send in our money – for what they want to sell. There's no good guys, no bad guys – just: we each have something the other wants.

Compromise can be tricky; largely if the compromise is seen as the final say in a matter, or is overbroad and unbalanced. Cf. Misssouri Compromise of 1820, or the 1876 Rutherford-Tilden Presidential election and the Compromise of 1877. Or, for you nuclear disarmament fans, the Partial (or Limited) Test Ban Treaty of 1963, whose follow-up, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (adopted 1996) has never come into force.

All of this is complicated right now in American politics by idiotic no compromise stances taken by both parties, but particularly that initiated by Mitch McConnell after the 2008 election. It is not helped by the likes of Senator Gillibrand, who voted against almost every nominee in the prior Administration – apparently just to have a talking point in her (brutally) unsuccessful 2020 Presidential campaign.

To end on a high note: Two examples of succesful compromise in action. In 1990, coal was used to generate 307 million kilowatts of electricity in the US, 42% of total production. In 2020, coal was down 30% to 218 million kilowatts, less than 20% of total production. In 1990, renewables (mainly hydro- ) generated 106 million kilowatts, more than doubling in 2020 to 284 million kilowatts, with almost all the increase in solar and wind. Where's the compromise? Solar and wind greatly benefited from federal (and state) tax incentives, incentives renewed by bipartisan compromise in the December 2020 COVID relief bill. And one I had a hand in: In 2006, the Government of Montenegro called for a referendum on independence from Serbia. Initially, the conditions for the referendum to be valid were unclear, as to the question to be asked, the margin of victory needed to seceed, and other related issues. Indepedence supporters wanted a threshold of 40%; State Unionists advocated 66.67%. A compromise threshold of 55% “Yes” to seceed was proposed by interested members of the International Community, a position accepted unanimously by Montenegro's Parliament – even though many MPs and their parties opposed dissolution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The 55.5% “Yes” vote was accepted by ALL concerned. A successful compromise.

* https://www.hoover.org/research/world-free-nuclear-weapons-0

 Posted (to FB) February 1:

Now that New START has been extended, good next largely unilateral* steps include:

1) Declarative moratorium on nuclear testing and prepare to submit the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) to the Senate;

2) End deployment of and funding for new nuclear warhead designs;

3) End the triad by phasing out land-based ICBMs;

4) Declare a No First Use policy;

5) Declare like-for-like retalitory policy;

6) End "Launch on Warning" policy;

7) Withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe (starting with Turkey!);

8) Re-enter the Open Skies Treaty (technically a conventional step);

9) Begin work on new Nuclear strategy (Nuclear Posture Review);

10) Eliminate (burn as fuel) fissile material from excess "retired" US warheads.

That's off the top of my head.

 Book Review All Against All: The Long Winter of 1933 and the Origins of the Second World War by Paul Jankowski

I'll agree that this is "A narrative [ ], cinematic in scope, of a process." But a history it is not. A proper history is analytical - why and not just what happened. "Delusions of nationalism" is an assertion, not analysis. Overall, the text is merely descriptive, no more so than when he devotes a paragraph to actress Jeanette MacDonald's impression of the appearance of German delegate (and rabid nationalist) Alfred Hugenberg at the 1933 London World Economic Conference.

The narrative itself is crippled by the author's style, which employs a muddled grammar (notably far too many indefinite referents) and odd metaphors that leaves a turgid account, one that had me reading the same sentence or paragraph over and over again until I finally fished out his meaning - or, too often, gave up and moved on.

His discussions of diplomacy are ill-founded. He asserts that the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, a backdrop to the disarmament discussions a decade later in Geneva, resulted from an aspirational verging on delusional attachment to disarmament, and necessitated the concurrent agreement guaranteeing security in China. At no point does the author note that no naval power of the time could afford the fleets they had in being and far less the extravagant armadas being built, that naval disarmament was an economic imperative.

As with understanding of diplomatic motivations, his discussion of diplomatic process is lacking. On the World Economic Conference of 1933, Jankowski states that FDR “never sought authority” from Congress to discuss war debts and tariffs. That's not how it works: the US Executive does not need “Congressional Authority” to discuss an issue, or even enter into negotiations. Congress is involved if the resulting agreement requires legislation to implement, or takes the form of a treaty require Senate consent. Even here, the author later restates the obstacle as instructions to the US delegation to not “sign” agreements without "congressional scrutiny.” And indeed, the author turns to discussions led by the UK and US central banks, in which participated seven other countries, which did reach an agreement including from the US delegation for referral to capitals.

Not worthless, but not worth the time it took to read. It's certainly not The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 by Christopher Clark.

From 26Feb21:  A lot of folks are acting upset that VP Harris is talking with world leaders. 1) That's a routine role for VPs, beginning with VP Nixon under Ike. 2) The VP is a statutory member of the National Security Council. 3) I do wonder whether the same folks getting upset now expressed their annoyance when unelected (and frankly unqualified) Presidential Advisors, not members of the NSC, took the same role. [Yes, Ivanka and Jared, notably.]

I wonder if those folks would be upset to learn that I represented the United States in a key meeting with the President of Montenegro...

As the snow melts from the roads in Minneapolis, I think back on my bicycle commute in DC: home, then in order past: CostCo, DEA HQ, Pentagon, National 9-11 Pentagon Memorial (pace MTG), Pentagon helipad, Arlington Cemetery, through Lady Bird Johnson Park, over Arlington Memorial Bridge, around the south side of the Lincoln Memorial, past Lincoln's gaze next to the Reflecting Pool (yes, the Official bike path runs right through the tourists), skirt the Vietnam Wall, a wave to Albert Einstein's statute hidden in the copse near the National Academy of Sciences, lock my bike, in through the “Joggers' Entrance” of the Harry S Truman building, and in to my office, a quick peak out through the blinds at the Washington Monument before settling into work.

Not a Yelp review.

So, about 15 years ago (!), I had cause to travel to Banja Luka, in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) every month or so. Back then, it was about a four hour drive, via Doboj and Prnjavor. Banja Luka is the capital of Republika Srpska (RS) - one of two component entities of BiH, and whose very name reminds the remaining non-Serb ethnic minorities of their, at best, second-class citizenship. So, leave Sarajevo early in the morning, working lunch in Banja Luka, more meetings, then check into a hotel for an overnight stay before yet more meetings the next day and the drive home.

My first trip up was in August, and it was suggested that I not stay at the usual "foreigners'" hotel, the Balkana*, as recent visitors found it less than pleasant and newer places had been opening, now that it was coming up on five years since the war.  Proposed was the Dvor*, near the center of town. Ok, said I.

Reception:  The desk wasn't busy, but the clerk still took his time to respond to my presence - which gave me to time to check out the dimly-lit array of pigeonholes behind the desk, each with the room key hanging in front of the slot when any guest was currently not in their room. I handed over my passport; the quickly-concealed expression across the clerk's face hinted at the expectation of a small emolument from the local secret service for promptly notifying them of my arrival and the chance to review the booklet. Oh well; it's not like they hadn't been tailing ever since we crossed the last bridge on the way intio Banja Luka. I was handed the key, told the room number and reminded to hand in my key any time I left the hotel grounds.

No elevator, so I trudge up the dimly-lit and somehow already crumbling stairs, just a single flight to my floor. At least I didn't have to tip the bellboy for carrying my overnight bag and showing me my room: no bellboy.

The Dvor's rooms were recently remodeled and refurnished. Apparently they obtained the wall-to-wall carpeting from a demolished Motel 6, and glued it directly to the concrete floor.  At least the room had air conditioning, a relief with  high temperatures around 90 F (32 C). But the air conditioning didn't work. At all. So open the window, as the night should be cool. The open window looked out over a sidewalk cafe, which afforded my tails a convenient and comfortable place to await my reappearance, and music. Loud music. Until 3 a.m. Not provided by the window - any sort of breeze, cool or otherwise.

Turn on the TV in time for the news and the weather, presented by a middle-aged woman, haired dyed "Balkan red" - in this case, orange. Like meterological forecasts anywhere, the weather report appeared to indicate that the weather halted at political boundaries. Surreal in Banja Luka, as Republika Srpska wraps around the Federation of BiH, and is itself encompassed by Croatia and Serbia. It was if the weather was affecting a very large horseshoe.

Off to bed, to sleep and perchance to dream. More like fat chance. The mattress was fair to being an imitation of a pool table, only without cushion rails, and the pillows bags of cement.

Morning arrives. No hot water and little water pressure. A Continental breakfast is included, so I traipse down to the serving room. As is too often the case on the Continent (and at least once in northern Virginia), the room is the basement. The white bread toast is dried out, the jam mere gelatin infused with food coloring, the "cold" cuts oddly warm, the slabs of pre-sliced cheese able to substitute for kitchen countertops, the coffee cold and faintly oily.

At least I got a receipt for my stay, to attach to my travel voucher.

* Names are changed. Standard disclaimer: The story, all names, characters, and incidents portrayed in this production are fictitious. No identification with actual persons (living or deceased), places, buildings, and products is intended or should be inferred. 

Overrated Classic: Fritz Fischer's Germany's Aims in the First World War

Fritz Fischer's Germany's Aims in the First World War is an acclaimed classic, usually cited for breaking with forty years of German accepted wisdom that, unlike in 1939, in 1914 Germany “slid” blamelessly into war (to quote UK PM Lloyd-George). That is to say, Fischer asserted iconoclastically that the German Reich bore "a substantial share of the historical responsibility for the outbreak of the general war." And this assertion, commonly accepted outside of Germany long before Fischer's 1961 pronouncement, is what gained Germany's Aims in the First World War such fame and notoriety – even though Fischer himself states in his book “It is not the purpose of this work (to debate) the question of war guilt.” p 87 And truly, what Fischer spends over 500 pages on is not war guilt, but an effort to show that the Second Reich sought to use the war to establish itself as a “world power,” through the political annexation of its nearest neighbors and the economic subordination of much of Europe into a Mitteleuropa.

Unfortunately for readability, Fischer pursues this goal by repetitive chronological rendering of state papers and the opinions of Germany's government officials and occasionally politicians and leading businessmen. Make no mistake, getting through this tome is a slog, one that is rarely rewarding.

Fischer's genuine thesis is buried halfway through the book: “Leading circles in Germany were convinced that only a victorious war ending in substantial gains would enable them to maintain their political and social order;” p. 329 Such a stance certainly explains the stubbornness with which the Emperor, Army (and Navy), and Reich and Prussian governments held to to arrogant war aims – domination of Belgium and Poland, exploitation of Romania, seizure of the Baltic, Ukraine, even Caucasus, and commandeering the mine fields of northeast France.

But Fischer's emptying of the German archives into his expose leads him astray, by overvaluing any and all documents that support his thesis of an unchecked German will to power. For example, he cites the views of the head of the German Colonial Association and the head of the Reich Colonial Office as proof of German war aims in Africa. p. 587 Bureaucratically, an organization will always advocate for its own narrow goals, irrespective of whether those goals serve the greater good. Without clear evidence that the goal was accepted by the state, such views are interesting, but not dispositive. One might as well say a child's wish for a pony proves the existence of the stable.

And again, Fischer proffers arguments such as that on page 603: “a long report (in June 1918) by the [Prussian] Ministry of State (was) one more testimony to Prussia's obstinate determination to expand....” It is more likely that the report is testimony to the inertia of bureaucracy, offering reports to the captain on how to arrange the deckchairs long after hitting the iceberg.

The past few years have seen numerous new books on the question of why the Great War broke out. Any of them, even the least of them, is a better contribution to the field than Fischer at this date.

Neither Confirm Nor Deny

"The White House does not confirm or deny unsubstantiated claims based on illegal leaks from anonymous individuals," said a White House spokesperson who declined to be named.

1) So, the WH statement is, itself, anonymous - and not to be believed?

2) "Neither confirm nor deny" is known as the Glomar response (see Wikipedia) -- aka a non-denial denial -- - and it turned out that the denial was demonstratively false. Or, as the NZ Government concluded when the US Navy refused to "confirm or deny" whether nuclear weapons were on board ships planning to make port visits - yep, there's nukes.

The Bigger Haystack

What's being missed in "Bowling Green massacre" story is what was reported at the time: In 2011, the FBI arrested two Iraqi refugees who were caught in a sting sending money to Al Qaeda (not planning an attack in the US). In 2013, ABC News reported: "Several dozen suspected terrorist bombmakers, including some believed to have targeted American troops, may have mistakenly been allowed to move to the United States as war refugees, according to FBI agents investigating the remnants of roadside bombs recovered from Iraq and Afghanistan."

That FBI belief led to reviewing the cases (identity, affiliation, etc) of 58,000 Iraqi refugees in this country. How many more arrests of suspected terrorists by the FBI or any law enforcement occurred? Zero are reported, six years later. It would appear that the vetting was already, shall we say, extreme - an error rate of 0.0017 %. And remember, the error was caught by domestic law enforcement, and before any harm occurred.

Meanwhile, the new policy is leading to large numbers of false positives: doctors, patients, prominent news producers, five year US citizens, the former Prime Minister of Norway. Rule of thumb: if you increase the size of the haystack, the chance of missing the needle goes up.

Wag the Dog, Part II - The Media Copies Each Other's Exam Papers

USA Today, 1/29/17: "In one of three executive actions Saturday, President Trump reshuffled the National Security Council to include his chief strategist, Stephen Bannon, and limited the roles of the director of national intelligence and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
BBC: "The director of national intelligence and the joint chiefs will attend when discussions pertain to their areas. Under previous administrations, the director and joint chiefs attended all meetings of the NSC's inner circle, the principals' committee."

WaPo: "That memo also states that the director of national intelligence and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will sit on the principals committee only when the issues to be discussed pertain to their “responsibilities and expertise.” In the previous two administrations, both were included as regular attendees."

Ok, here's the relevant sentence from the 2009 and 2017 memos:

"The Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisers to the NSC, shall attend NSC meetings."

"The Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisers to the NSC, shall also attend NSC meetings."

Quick: Which is the 2009 memo, and which is from 2017? Bonus points - what is the difference, and what is its effect?

Digging even deeper, WaPo transposed the words quoted as "responsibilities and expertise" from the memo's discussion of the senior subcommittee (the PC), which "considers policy", to the NSC proper, which "advises the President." The roles are not the same, and the more limited PC role does always require direct intel and unformed military involvement in the discussion itself.

Wag the Dog

 I just (re-)read Obama's memo organizing the NSC, and the new one. The status of the DNI and the CJCS is essentially unchanged (the caveat is because the new memo describes the Prez, VP, and Secretaries as attendees at Council meetings, where Obama had those as Council members, with only advisers described as attending).

Bannon and (apparently) Kushner are added, which is both highly atypical and not surprising, for the same reason: until now, purely political types were kept out to minimize "Wag the Dog" scenarios.

The most interesting omission is the former memo's requirement that "The NSC shall meet regularly and as required."

https://www.lawfareblog.com/national-security...

Resignation of Political Ambassadors: Tempest in a Teapot (So Far)

Honestly, I feel the NYT and others have blown the resignation of political ambassadors out of proportion. (NB: I retired from State after 25 years as a Foreign Service Officer.) Some media, even Reuters, have abbreviated this as "all ambassadors appointed by Obama" are to resign. Well, all ambassadors, career and political, are appointed by the President. Traditionally, ALL "political" ambassadors are asked to resign before a new President takes office - but the career folks stay in place.

E.g.: There are three (sometimes four) ambassadors in Geneva - UN, Disarmament (CD), WTO (Human Rights). In Early 2009, the UN ambassador left on his private plane on the morning on January 20. My boss (Disarmament) left a few days before. Even though our new boss was a career FSO, she was not sworn in until March 2010. We functioned fine in the 15-month gap, facilitating in Geneva a successful seven-month negotiation of the New START treaty, cutting nukes 30%. So things get done without ambassadors in place.

Remember too that many (way too many, IMO) of the political ambassadors got the nod by raising campaign funds, and have little to no qualification for the job. (These are carried by the career staff.) Obama's political amb to Luxembourg was so awful her two senior career officers transferred to Iraq and Afghanistan! They are also rich (see Geneva amb & private jet, above). Every one of these should have started packing November 9th.

The folks I feel sorry for are the management folks who have political appointees who thought they could stay on - and now have to scramble to get them out the door. And of course for millions of Americans, not nearly so well off, who will be harmed by the policies of the next two years.

And all bets are off if the new powers-that-be start going after career national security folks, in State, intel, and defense.

Warning: No simple answers ahead.

Greg Palast, reported on RT, reports on the vote-suppression caused by the "Crosscheck" program, designed by GOP Kansas SecState Kris Kobach to suppress registration of likely Dem voters in the guise of removing duplicate registrations. Now, I like Greg Palast, who does solid fieldwork and writes articulately. But I see no reason to say that "X" is the reason the election came out the way it did - so "A", "B", "Y", and "Z" are irrelevant. That's stage-magic, and it doesn't matter if the stage is PEOTUS' Twitter or RT's (Russia Today before they started to obscure Russian government funding - and control).

Remember that this story is in fact bigger than the election and hacking of the DNC. The sanctions announced at the end of the year also responded to: "a pattern of harassment of our diplomats overseas that has increased over the last four years, including a significant increase in the last 12 months. This harassment has involved arbitrary police stops, physical assault, and the broadcast on State TV of personal details about our personnel that put them at risk. In addition, the Russian Government has impeded our diplomatic operations by, among other actions: forcing the closure of 28 American Corners which hosted cultural programs and English-language teaching;" 

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/266145.htm

Book Review: The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain's Rush to War 1914, by Douglas Newton

Newton delivers a solid piece of historical research, exploding the myths of why, how, and importantly when Britain decided on war in 1914. The classic myth is that Britain only decided on war AFTER Germany invaded “plucky little” Belgium on August 4th, declaring war late that evening. Newton shows that the very senior members of Britain's government, acting without Parliament or even the larger Cabinet, decided on war August 2^nd, in support of the “Ententes” with Russia and France, themselves designed not to constrain Germany, but to de-conflict the British Empire's colonial holdings in Africa and Asia.

In this account, PM Asquith, Foreign Minister Grey, and First Sea Lord Churchill controlled the descent into war. Only Asquith's motivation is explored in depth, stressing his desire to keep his Liberal government in power. (Ironically, a coalition with the Conservatives was unavoidable in May 1915, resulting from poor management of the war.)

Newton also all too briefly sketches the nascent opposition to war, nipped in the bud by the heavy-handed rush to war.

Newton's writing style is solid but academic, and the book is not a”page-turner.” It is however a useful counter to the “fairy tale” of Britain being forced into war by “dire necessity.” At the least, any reader interested in the origins of World War One should read Newton's last two paragraphs, Radical Recriminations, and Conclusion,where he gives an excellent summary of his arguments.

Battlefield Diplomacy

Book Review: The Dead Hand - The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy

David E. Hoffman's Dead Hand  is both well-researched and well-written - but in its focus on Gorbachev and Reagan, it lacks analysis. When faced with the question, why did  Gorbachev continue funding the hidden, and quite illegal, Soviet biological weapons program while seeking the complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, Hoffman shrugs. Hoffman never raises the question of why the Soviets hated Reagan's SDI ("Star Wars" - ballistic missile defense). Nor does it occur to Hoffman to examine what Reagan did, and could have done, to push his Administration to support his goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I don't have a good answer for the last - but Hoffman, as a political reporter, could have presumably done more on the question.

The penultimate chapter of Dead Hand hints at why the Soviets, if not Gorbachev himself, kept the biological weapons program. Namely, it becomes a war-winning weapon in the absence of opposing WMD systems, particularly if the weapons are deployed on the scale envisioned by the Soviets. Compliance with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWTC) is still, in 2015, nearly impossible to verify, given the BWTC's lack of any verification protocol. As shown by Aum Shinrikyo's 1994 and 1995 (Tokyo subway) attacks, biological weapons are comparatively easy to acquire and deliver, with research and production of the weapons easily concealed.

Conversely, Hoffman never considers why the Soviets feared a viable ballistic missile defense (BMD). Hoffman takes Reagan at his word, that BMD would be a passive shield. Hoffman never considers that shields and armor exist not to preserve the combatant against repeated, unreturned blows, but to enable the armored fighter to deliver a decisive attack while surviving the exchange.

Let's consider two countries, perfect reciprocals. Both have 1000 missiles with 3 nuclear warheads each. Each has 100 cities with 1 million population each; each city takes 5 warheads to destroy. Likewise, each missile is in a silo, which takes two warheads to destroy. Each missile has 95% accuracy against a city, but only 
60% against a silo. (You have to hit much closer to a hardened silo to destroy it, compared to a city.)

Without BMD, a first strike against silos leaves 100 to 200 missiles to retaliate. The retaliation essentially destroys 90% of the attacker's cities.  If the first striker has BMD to destroy that retaliation, it can strike without injury to itself. And if the BMD has to handle 100 to 200 missiles, rather than 1000, the task is simplified and the efficacy of the shield improved.

The world is safer with fewer nuclear weapons, and will be safer with even fewer still. But the last phase, from several hundred to zero, will be tricky - and much trickier than the Dead Hand would lead one to believe.

Iran Deal: SEN Chuck Schumer Demands a Unicorn

Senator Chuck Schumer (D - NY) has stated he will oppose the P5+1 deal halting and rolling back efforts by Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. https://medium.com/@SenSchumer/my-position-on-the-iran-deal-e976b2f13478  Why? Well, centrally he says: "First, inspections are not “anywhere, anytime” and "Even more troubling is the fact that the U.S. cannot demand inspections unilaterally. "

That's right, Senator, Iran is not going to let foreign inspectors walk into ANY location in Iran, at ANY time, at the sole say-so and direction of its chief global opponent. What country, not prostrate after a total war, would allow that? You, sir, have asked for a unicorn. Under the deal, the IAEA inspections are extremely rigorous, more so than in any other country. Real arms control experts have said it is nearly impossible for Iran to have a nuclear weapons program under this deal. http://www.vox.com/2015/7/15/8967147/iran-nuclear-deal-jeffrey-lewis  The level of inspections demanded by Schumer are unneccessary and tantamount to granting the CIA an open door into the entire Iranian government, economy, and society. After the 1953 CIA-backed coup, the Iranians would never agree to that.

Senator Schumer's standards for the key goals under this agreement are fanciful. He might as well ask for a unicorn.

McCain's BFF Running for President

So, Sen. Lindsey Graham has announced that he will announce on June 1 "whether" he is running for President. On the one hand, as a (up until now anyway) lifelong bachelor, he would be only the second such to enter the Oval Office. OOTH, ... yech.

He says that he is running for the office because "he's been more right than wrong on foreign policy." Really? Because he also said the 2003 Iraq war was the result of "faulty intelligence ... but (with) faulty intelligence the entire world believed." Right. That's why we renamed Freedom fries French fries, to honor our Gallic allies in the 2003 invasion. The solid, nay unanimous UN Security Council vote for a resolution authorizing military action. Ambassador Wilson alerting us all to Iraq's purchases of uranium ore ("yellowcake"). Hans Blix coming back from Iraq and assuring us all that Saddam is just weeks away from having a nuke. The Department of Energy and State's Intelligence and Research (INR) agencies guaranteeing that the aluminum tubes were for centrifuges, not conventional military items. Top US General Shinseki stating that a small force would be ok, we "would be welcomed as liberators."  Oh, right. NONE OF THAT HAPPENED. Rather, just the opposite. 

Graham, a lawyer and USAF JAG, has also recently proclaimed in Iowa that, "If I'm President of the United States and you're thinkin' about joining al-Qaeda or ISIL -- anybody thinkin' about that -- I'm not going to call a judge, I'm going to call a drone and we will kill you." Which further demonstrates his firm grasp on the rule of law and reality.  Or not.

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article21166422.html#storylink=cpy

Class Immobility

The Atlantic Monthly posed an interesting article online, "The Best Way to Nab Your Dream Job Out of College? Be Born Rich." When I worked for the State Department, I hired a number of interns. With a very short-time frame for hiring decisions, the application was decisive. For me, unlike those in article, "school prestige" didn't cut it at all - which school the applicant attended was the LAST thing I looked at. I ignored extra-curricular activities like "rock-climbing" and "lacrosse;" an extra-curricular activity related to the position for they applied was very valuable, however. I also tried very hard to ignore gender. What I did look at was why they wanted to intern with my office, and whether their essay was well-written, because the jobs always included a LOT of writing.

History without Analysis

The Month That Changed the World: July 1914, by Gordon Martel. 2014.

Gordon Martel, in his The Month That Changed the World: July 1914, has set out a chronological narrative of the actions taken by European government officials, largely those in the foreign ministries of the Great Powers, in the last week of prior to the outbreak of the Great War. In a sense, Martel's book is Luigi Albertini (The Origins of the War of 1914) writ small. Martel avoids assigning guilt for the war, and eschews judging the decisions of his characters. In his last chapter, he castigates those historians who explore the "what ifs" of 1914, decisions that if made differently may have avoided war.

Martel's book strikes me as incomplete. In focusing on the senior foreign ministry officials and heads of state, he gives the impression that foreign policy is made in a vacuum occupied solely by those gentlemen. More serious is his exclusion of any serious investigation of why Vienna persisted in its assumption that Russia would not take military action against Austria-Hungary, right up through Russian mobilization and Germany's declaration of war against Russia (even before Vienna had so declared).  A key figure in that blindness is the Austrian military Chief of Staff Conrad. Perhaps as Conrad is not a diplomat, Martel figured he was not part of his thesis.

The biggest weakness is the book's lack of analysis, of judgment. Martel has written another book, The Origins of the First World War (1987), and perhaps that book would be more satisfactory. As it is, The Month That Changed the World: July 1914 feels like research notes, carefully arranged in chronological order.

I do recommend Clark's  The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.