Posted (to FB) February 1:

Now that New START has been extended, good next largely unilateral* steps include:

1) Declarative moratorium on nuclear testing and prepare to submit the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) to the Senate;

2) End deployment of and funding for new nuclear warhead designs;

3) End the triad by phasing out land-based ICBMs;

4) Declare a No First Use policy;

5) Declare like-for-like retalitory policy;

6) End "Launch on Warning" policy;

7) Withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe (starting with Turkey!);

8) Re-enter the Open Skies Treaty (technically a conventional step);

9) Begin work on new Nuclear strategy (Nuclear Posture Review);

10) Eliminate (burn as fuel) fissile material from excess "retired" US warheads.

That's off the top of my head.

Book Review: The Dead Hand - The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy

David E. Hoffman's Dead Hand  is both well-researched and well-written - but in its focus on Gorbachev and Reagan, it lacks analysis. When faced with the question, why did  Gorbachev continue funding the hidden, and quite illegal, Soviet biological weapons program while seeking the complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, Hoffman shrugs. Hoffman never raises the question of why the Soviets hated Reagan's SDI ("Star Wars" - ballistic missile defense). Nor does it occur to Hoffman to examine what Reagan did, and could have done, to push his Administration to support his goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I don't have a good answer for the last - but Hoffman, as a political reporter, could have presumably done more on the question.

The penultimate chapter of Dead Hand hints at why the Soviets, if not Gorbachev himself, kept the biological weapons program. Namely, it becomes a war-winning weapon in the absence of opposing WMD systems, particularly if the weapons are deployed on the scale envisioned by the Soviets. Compliance with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWTC) is still, in 2015, nearly impossible to verify, given the BWTC's lack of any verification protocol. As shown by Aum Shinrikyo's 1994 and 1995 (Tokyo subway) attacks, biological weapons are comparatively easy to acquire and deliver, with research and production of the weapons easily concealed.

Conversely, Hoffman never considers why the Soviets feared a viable ballistic missile defense (BMD). Hoffman takes Reagan at his word, that BMD would be a passive shield. Hoffman never considers that shields and armor exist not to preserve the combatant against repeated, unreturned blows, but to enable the armored fighter to deliver a decisive attack while surviving the exchange.

Let's consider two countries, perfect reciprocals. Both have 1000 missiles with 3 nuclear warheads each. Each has 100 cities with 1 million population each; each city takes 5 warheads to destroy. Likewise, each missile is in a silo, which takes two warheads to destroy. Each missile has 95% accuracy against a city, but only 
60% against a silo. (You have to hit much closer to a hardened silo to destroy it, compared to a city.)

Without BMD, a first strike against silos leaves 100 to 200 missiles to retaliate. The retaliation essentially destroys 90% of the attacker's cities.  If the first striker has BMD to destroy that retaliation, it can strike without injury to itself. And if the BMD has to handle 100 to 200 missiles, rather than 1000, the task is simplified and the efficacy of the shield improved.

The world is safer with fewer nuclear weapons, and will be safer with even fewer still. But the last phase, from several hundred to zero, will be tricky - and much trickier than the Dead Hand would lead one to believe.

Atomic Bombs on Japan - Unnecessary, or Even a War Crime?

Sorry, but I utterly disagree. Full disclosure: if not for the sudden end to the war in the Pacific, unforeseeable without the use of the atomic bomb, I probably wouldn't even be writing this. My father narrowly escaped death off Okinawa, where his lightly-armed, unarmored, and highly vulnerable merchant ship was repeatedly targeted by kamikaze attacks. When the war ended, he was scheduled to return to the Pacific, where the Japanese had five times as many kamikaze attacks readied - Allied planners estimated that 1/3 to 1/2 of the invasion force could be lost before landing.

The last straw was not Soviet attacks against the Japanese army occupying Manchuria, which was not considered a core part of the Japanese Empire. Starting in 1942, most of the Japanese army in Manchuria had been transferred to fight the US; what remained was raw recruits, understrength and poorly equipped. Indeed, in his speech announcing surrender, Emperor Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings, but not once to the Soviet attack, a view he repeated to General MacArthur in September 1945.

I am at the forefront of those calling for further sharp reductions in American (and other states') nuclear weapons. I am proud to be considered a member of the US delegation that negotiated the New START Treaty, which cut the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and their launchers for both the US and Russia. I am proud of the work I did to push for a treaty ending production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (Pakistan continues to block work on such an agreement.) . I have written both of my Senators, and my Congressman, urging them to support the P5+1 Iran deal. I have made my support for that deal very public. I even question whether US interests in the Pacific and Asia were of a such a degree as to risk provoking war with Japan (my internal jury is still out on that one). But I do not let my strong, unshakeable stance against the continued construction and possession of nuclear weapons blind me to their great utility in ending the horrors that would have ensued had World War II been prosecuted after August 1945.

Iran Deal: SEN Chuck Schumer Demands a Unicorn

Senator Chuck Schumer (D - NY) has stated he will oppose the P5+1 deal halting and rolling back efforts by Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. https://medium.com/@SenSchumer/my-position-on-the-iran-deal-e976b2f13478  Why? Well, centrally he says: "First, inspections are not “anywhere, anytime” and "Even more troubling is the fact that the U.S. cannot demand inspections unilaterally. "

That's right, Senator, Iran is not going to let foreign inspectors walk into ANY location in Iran, at ANY time, at the sole say-so and direction of its chief global opponent. What country, not prostrate after a total war, would allow that? You, sir, have asked for a unicorn. Under the deal, the IAEA inspections are extremely rigorous, more so than in any other country. Real arms control experts have said it is nearly impossible for Iran to have a nuclear weapons program under this deal. http://www.vox.com/2015/7/15/8967147/iran-nuclear-deal-jeffrey-lewis  The level of inspections demanded by Schumer are unneccessary and tantamount to granting the CIA an open door into the entire Iranian government, economy, and society. After the 1953 CIA-backed coup, the Iranians would never agree to that.

Senator Schumer's standards for the key goals under this agreement are fanciful. He might as well ask for a unicorn.

Iran's Nuclear Program in Rollback

So, two decades ago when I was the (first-ever)  political-military advisor in the State Department's Bureau of South Asian Affairs, we set a broad strategy for our approach to nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan: we would seek the two countries' agreement to cap, then roll-back, and finally, hopefully, eliminate the nuclear weapons on the subcontinent.

That has not gone so well.

On the other hand, noted nuclear proliferation expert Joe Cirincione has just said, in The Atlantic, that Iran is rolling back its stock of medium enriched uranium. Not just capped. Rolled back. And Tehran appears open to rejiggering its plutonium plant to render it far less capable of producing enough weapons-grade material, as well.

Diplomacy works - if you can get the politicians to simply quit pandering.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/04/the-iranian-nuclear-deal-is-working/361066/