What was written as current affairs is now popular history and military sociology.

In March 1995, at what we now know to be the midpoint between the Cold War and the so-called Global War on Terror, military journalist Tom Ricks embedded himself in a platoon of recruits going through Marine Corps boot camp at the famed Parris Island. Making the Corps, Ricks' account of that experience, was published in the late summer of 1997, just as I enrolled – as a Foreign Service Officer – in the Marine Corps' Command and Staff College in Quantico. Like Ricks, in my ten years in the State Department (to that point), I had had frequent contact with Marines – the detachments that secured our embassies, and my Ambassador in Jamaica, who had been the first African-American to lead a Marine infantry unit in combat (in Vietnam), and was at that time a Reserve USMC Major General (two-star).

The bulk of the book is, properly enough, taken up with the literal trials and tribulations of the 63 men who seek to gain the title and dignity of being called “U.S. Marine,” which will only come after they complete the eleven week course. Ricks, much like the drill sergeants, focuses his attention on the stand-outs and wash-outs among the recruits. For the D.I.s, those in the middle will do ok without their attention. For Ricks, the ends of the bell curve provide better stories: “reformed” white supremacists and nominally criminal gang members from SE Washington DC are more interesting than fast food employees or even a washed up accountant. And it is interesting – but is it an authentic picture of the Marine recruit in the mid-1990s? Probably not.

Where the book really disappoints though is the penultimate chapter, Ricks' attempt to predict the coming role of the Marines and the US military. Having belabored the idea that there exists a deep and widening gap between the military generally and the Marines specifically and civilian culture at large, Ricks doubles down. Earlier, he noted that the skinhead and the gangbanger agreed that a “race war” was coming to America (and that Jews were at fault). In this latter chapter, he turns to experts with better credentials but the same bigotry to argue that as the military experiences the then-expected downsizing, and American culture is ravaged by the supposed acolytes of cultural Marxism, the Marines will be called on to maintain peace and order at home. Ricks is blind to oncoming rush of terrorism, even though al Qaeda had already bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 and the USAF barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia in 1996 (initially atributed to Hezbollah and its backer Iran), neither of which he mentions, and the Marines suffered 220 deaths in the 1983 Beirut terror bombing (which Ricks does mention).

In that chapter, Ricks worries about the increasing politicization of individual Marine and military officers, taking as his benchmark a mythical past in which US military officers were strictly apolitical, not even voting. The benchmark, the myth, studiously ignores the real history, which saw the former Commanding General of the U.S. Army George McClellan candidacy against his former Commander-in-Chief Lincoln in 1864, General Douglas MacArthur flirt with a run for President in 1952; the cigar-chomping, fire-bombing, warmongering General Curtis Lemay's run for Vice-President in 1968; and the similar role of Admiral James Stockdale in 1992.

Making the Corps is well-written, and Ricks had almost astonishing access to the boot camp experience. A very good effort for his first book-length essay. But in the end, this is descriptive, not analytical or incisive, and it remains a curio for the curious, easily laid aside and forgotten.

 On this day in history, April 6, 1945, my father's ship, the SS Pierre Victory, arrived at Kerama Retto, an anchorage of small islets some 15 miles (25 kilometers) west of Okinawa. The ship carried some 7000 tons of ammunition for the US forces that had just invaded Okinawa. Almost immediately, Japanese kamikaze planes attacked, sinking two other Victory ships and a smaller LST.

The Pierre Victory survived weeks of attacks as she was gradually unloaded - running out of ammo for her own guns before emptying her holds of ammuntion for the guns ashore.

Dad returned to the States, marrying his high school sweetheart - my mom - in June 1945.

Below: LST-447 explodes after being hit by a kamikaze, April 6, 1945.

http://www.armed-guard.com/item06.html

Book Review: The Longest Winter: The Battle of the Bulge and the Epic Story of World War II's Most Decorated Platoon (Hardcover) by Alex Kershaw

When Kershaw is relating the stories of the members of the I&R platoon (Intelligence and Recon (scout) 394th Infantry regiment, 99th Division, US Army) , drawing on his personal interviews with the veterans, the book is pretty good. At that point, it is a compelling story of men under fire and duress. When he is setting the larger context, drawing on secondary sources, the story is trite and filled with niggling errors.

I also disliked the amount of attention given to Skorzeny and SS Col. Peiper. In particular, Kershaw imples that Peiper was unfairly targeted by "Communists" after the war. Here's the thing: a commanding officer is responsible for the behavior of ALL the troops under his command. It does not matter if Peiper was not personally present at the Malmedy Massacre, or that he did not order the killings of POWs. When atrocities occured, it was Peiper's responsibility to punish those of his subordinates who transgressed. Op. cit. Jadranko Prlić, Rasim Delić, Atif Dudaković, Sakib Mahmuljin - all convicted of war crimes during the Bosnian War (1992-5) for their failure to adequately supervise troops under their command. And Prlić was a politician, not an army commander in the field. (I also met all four after the war.) [N.b.: Dudaković has been charged; he has not been tried as of this writing.]

 Posted (to FB) February 1:

Now that New START has been extended, good next largely unilateral* steps include:

1) Declarative moratorium on nuclear testing and prepare to submit the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) to the Senate;

2) End deployment of and funding for new nuclear warhead designs;

3) End the triad by phasing out land-based ICBMs;

4) Declare a No First Use policy;

5) Declare like-for-like retalitory policy;

6) End "Launch on Warning" policy;

7) Withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe (starting with Turkey!);

8) Re-enter the Open Skies Treaty (technically a conventional step);

9) Begin work on new Nuclear strategy (Nuclear Posture Review);

10) Eliminate (burn as fuel) fissile material from excess "retired" US warheads.

That's off the top of my head.

 

Forlorn Hopes, Lost Causes, Bitter Enders, and Gotterdammerung: The Romance of Pointless Defiance

Throughout history – or at least in the tales white European men tell themselves (which until recently was the same thing), there reoccurs stories of defiance, to be lauded and held up as an example of how to act. Often, a dispassionate review shows what happened (or was attempted) to be pointless: nothing was gained, much was lost to no advantage to anyone.

Forlorn Hope

Technically, a Forlorn Hope is a near-suicidal attack, ordered when more conventional approaches have failed, in the hope that the Forlorn Hope will make an overall victory possible, From the Dutch “Verloren Hoop” or Lost Troop. Colloquially, it is used in American English as a synonym for Last Stand. Compare with the word “Awful”, which should be the superlative for awesome, but has come to mean its opposite.

In 1861, France, the UK, and Spain decided that Mexico's unilateral two-year moratorium on paying interest on the state debt could and should be lifted – at the point of a bayonet or two. The UK and Spain left with their money, the French decided to expand the empire (thus, “Amerique latine or Latin America” a term devised in Colombia in 1856 but popularised by Napoleon III). This ultimately did not turn out so well for Emperor Napoleon III of France – and quite badly for erstwhile Archduke Maximilian of Austria: shot for his troubles (and posing as Emperor of Mexico) when the French were forced out in 1867. But I am getting ahead of my story. So, May 5, 1862 – nope, too far back. Keep this up, and I may sink my readers' interest.

On April 30, 1863, 65 Legionaires of the French Foreign Legion were sent to reinforce the escort of a convoy, itself in support of the French siege of the Mexican stronghold of Puebla, on the way to the capital of Mexico City. The Legionaires found themselves cut off by a stronger force – which kept getting bigger: 250, 600, 1400; by the end more than 3000. French Captain Danjou, surrounded, had his men swear – on Danjou's prosthetic hand! - to fight to the death rather than surrender, in (supposed) imitation of Napoleon's Guard at Waterloo. The Mexicans offered to let the French surrender. Non! Said Danjou, quickly meeting his own death. More Mexicans arrived; another offer to the hungry, thirsty Legionaires. Merde! Exclaimed the remaining sergeant. Late in the afternoon, the Mexicans again offered surrender, now to the last 12 men on their feet. Again no. Out of ammo, the last five (or six) fixed bayonets and charged. Then the final three at last surrendered. The Legionaires had, truly, “fought like demons.” and Danjou's hand is a central relic for the Legion to this day.

Glory without end. But to what effect? The French had early on halted the convoy when they saw the large interposing Mexican force. And ran the convoy through to the siege in prompt order over the next few days. The Legionaires taken prisoner were treated well, and exchanged to the French on Bastille Day, 14 July 1863. Puebla, then Mexico City, fell to the French. But by the end of 1866, France had withdrawn most of its troops, pressured by the United States that had won its own Civil War. Mid-May 1867 Mexico City was retaken by Mexican forces, Maximilian captured, court-martialed and shot on 19 June, a few days short of his 35^th birthday; and thousands of miles from his birthplace in Schloss Schönbrunn in Vienna. The Legionaires's sacrifice was glorious – but operationally pointless. The Legionaires had fought – and died – for Glory and Honor. Nothing less. And nothing more.

Lost Causes

Ah, The Lost Cause! The South Will Rise Again! No, not The Lost Cause. A lost cause. Partly because The Lost Cause is too well known. But mainly because pursuit of The Lost Cause hasn't been anywhere near as futile as one could hope, and certainly doesn't rank as pointless defiance.

Real lost causes did arise in the decades after Camarón. (I forgot to mention that, didn't I? The pointless encounter in 1863 is known as the Battle of Camarón, after the small town near Vera Cruz where it took place.) One such lost cause is The War of the Triple Alliance, or Paraguayan War, (1864-1870) begun by Paraguay against Brazil. Then Argentina and Uruguay weighed in – against Paraguay. While the weight of military force was slightly to Paraguay's advantage to start, in a long war, its isolated position and demographic inferiority led it to doom. Paraguay lost up to 1/3 of its territory, 1/2 or more of its population and nearly every adult male. Arguably, it has yet to recover.

Then there are Queen Victoria's Little Wars, in Africa, Asia, Canada (!), as small numbers of heavily armed soldiers wrack ruin and conquest in service of Her Majesty, glory, empire, and extension of Rudyard Kipling's “White Man's Burden” - that of “civilization” and “Christianity.” Result was – well, two good movies: “Zulu” (the 1964 one) and “The Man Who Would be King” (1975).

These are lost causes. However, pointless and defiant don't really describe these lost causes.

But the Fenian Raids? Defiant? Check. Pointless? Check.

From 1845 to 1849, the Great Famine ravaged Ireland. Greedy English landlords, backed by the heartless government in London, allowed 1 million to starve to death, while another million fled abroad: to Canada, Australia, Mexico (!). And the United States, on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line. After the Civil War, thousands of Irish men had military training, weapons, a bit of money, time, and national pride in their Irish homeland. Also a persistent grievance against the English.

Ireland remained an ocean away, strongly occupied by professional soldiers who were demonstrably capable of resisting uprising (1798), rebellion (1803, 1848) and planned insurrection (1865). But Canada? It – actually they (Canada was not a unified colony in 1865) – was near by; just across the border. And heck, the Americans almost took it. Twice (1775, 1812).

Not that the Irish in America wanted Canada. Nah. They'd take it – or at least key points and infrastructure – and TRADE it back to the English for Ireland.

The Fenians began this well thought out campaign in April 1866 with an attack on Campo Bello (now Campobello) New Brunswick. First assembling their men across the narrow strait in Maine … well, that's where it stopped. The British could see what the Fenians were up to and preempted the attack by moving 700 regular soldiers and warships over from Halifax.

In June 1866, the Fenians launched two raids, and this time both successfully got across the border. With the warship USS Michigan disabled by Fenian sympathisizers, something over 1000 Fenians crossed the Niagara River west from Buffalo toward Fort Erie. The next moming, they ambushed a large force of Canadian militia, inflicting numerous casualties and taking prisoners. But with the Michigan back in operation, cutting the Fenains off from supply and reinforcement, and British regulars and more Canadian militia approaching, the Fenians crossed back into the U.S. where they surrendered. U.S. President Andrew Johnson called the Fenians “evil-disposed persons” and said their actions were illegal under American and international law.

Which didn't stop the next raid, the day after Johnson's proclamation. This time just under 1000 Fenians set from St Albans Vermont and briefly took four Canadian villages before being chased off by Canadian cavalry. (To be fair, in 1864 a raid the other direction by Confederates who had escaped from Union POW camps robbed three banks in the selfsame St Albans, making off with at least $88,000 (about $1.5 million today).)

American public opinion favored the Fenians, and they were released and got their weapons back under executive orders signed by Johnson ahead of the November Congressional elections.

Raids resumed in 1870, two in late May. At Eccles Hill, essentially ON the Vermont-Canada border, a brief skirmish quickly dispersed the Fenians. Two days later and some miles west, another force of Fenians is fired upon by Canadian troops and “redeploy” back into New York, where their leader John O'Neill is promptly arrested by the US Marshal.

And one more – my favorite! O'Neill, recently released from prison after a pardon from President Grant, travels to St. Paul Minnesota (!) to plan a raid on Winnipeg. On October 5, 1871 he and three dozen Fenians capture the Hudson's Bay Company post in Pembina. Those of you who know your North Dakota-Manitoba geography well, or have just travelled by car between Winnipeg and St Paul, may be scratching your heads. Yes, Pembina is and was in North Dakota. In the United States.

At this point the Fenians in the United States decided these raids were a little worse than pointless, and started sending money to the Irish in Ireland – and England. Which while no longer pointless did lead to much violence and bloodshed. Another unified and ultimately independent country can however trace its origins to the Fenians raids. The Dominion of Canada began the unification of Canada on 1 July 1867, at least in part in response to the 1866 raids.

Bitter Enders

So, the 19^th Century Pax Brittanica was a facade in Canada. But surely elsewhere it held? The flag never sets on the British Empire and all that? Even before the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, Britain had “gone abroad in search of monsters to destroy” in the words of US Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. From 1815 to 1902, Britain was almost constantly at war, but rarely against anyone of white European stock. To the dismay of its settlers, the British made an exception of the Cape Colony in South Africa. A brief Boer (Dutch: “farmer”) rebellion in 1815, described by a partisan observer as "the most insane attempt ever made by a set of men to wage war against their sovereign" was brutually crushed. What followed was almost ninety years of a lethal Mad Hatter's Party, as the British repression and dislike of the Boers resulted in them moving further and further inland. For the Boers, this was the Great Trek. (For English speakers, we picked up a new word.) A partial status vivendi was reached in 1881, when the British lost the three-month-long First Boer War. Then, most unfortunately for the Boers, they found .. GOLD! “Outlanders” - mainly Brits – flooded into Boer lands. In October 1899, the Boers demanded that the Brits leave them alone. British sentiment was led by the likes of Cecil Rhodes (he of Rhodesia and the Rhodes Scholarship), who called for armed defense of “outlander” rights and better treatment for Black Africans (no, really).

The first phase of the war went badly for the British. Famously, Lord Baden-Powell was besieged in Mafeking, with only Sunday cricket matches (and concerts) for light entertainment until relieved, with His Lordship going on to create the Boy Scouts. (Nevermind he had been ordered to NOT defend in Mafeking.) Nonetheless, less than a year after the conflict started, the Boer capitals of Bloemfontein and Pretoria had fallen. The regular, stand-up war was over.

But the Bittereinders among the Boers did not give up, their commandos (another new word for English!) turning to guerilla warfare. (Guerilla was not a new word, arising in 1809 from the [Iberian] Penisular War of Wellington against Napoleonic France.) About half of the orignal Boer force stayed in the field as combatants. Those 25 thousand or so commandos were opposed by up to 500,000 British, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders.Twenty-to-one odds did not suffice, so the British commander ordered a scorched earth policy, destroying Boer settlements and driving the old men, women and children – and Black “servants” – into concentration camps. (TWO new phrases: scorched earth and concentration camps.) 6,189 Boer commandoes died in the field, along with over 22,000 Brits. Over 25,000 Boer women and 22,000 children under age 16 (about 20% of those detained) died, along with uncounted thousands of Black Africans. (See British war aims, above.)

Also decimated was the British budget: “defence” spending skyrocketed from 35 million pounds annually to 120 million – over 6% of GDP. Cheap compared to World War One, but four times what the UK spends today.

Not so much pointless defiance as a bitter end.

Götterdämmerung

In April 1945, the Berlin Philharmonic played its last concerts in Nazi Germany. The musicians played the finale of Wagner's Götterdämmerung , Brahms' German Requiem (requiem: to honor the dead), and Strauss' Death and Transfiguration. For any concert-goers who missed the point, Hitler Youth reportedly passed out cyanide pills.

Eight months earlier, another major European capital was about to fall to an approaching army: Paris. Or would it? In the 1960's there was published a book, followed by a movie, both with the title, Is Paris Burning? - reportedly the words asked with no sense of ironic foreshadowing by Hitler on August 25, 1944 as French and American troops entered the City of Lights. We learned this first through the memoirs – indeed, apologia – of General Dietrich von Choltitz, the last German commander of Paris. There is solid documentary evidence that on the morning of August 23, Hitler had in fact ordered that “The Seine bridges will be prepared for demolition. Paris must not fall into the hands of the enemy except as a field of ruins.” Also known as the Trümmerfeld order. As recounted in the official US Army History Breakout and Pursuit, von Choltitz informed his superior headquarters later that same day:

that he had complied by placing three tons of explosive in the cathedral of Notre Dame, two tons in the Invalides, and one in the Palais Bourbon (the Chamber of Deputies), that he was ready to level the Arc de Triomphe to clear a field of fire, that he was prepared to destroy the Opéra and the Madeleine, and that he was planning to dynamite the Tour Eiffel and use it as a wire entanglement to block the Seine. Incidentally, he advised Speidel, he found it impossible to destroy the seventy-odd bridges.

Von Choltitz was likely being sarcastic, as he had begun the phone call “by thanking Speidel for the lovely order from Hitler.” Nevertheless, in the days and weeks after the surrender of Paris, many (still intact) bridges and monuments did have to be demined. Von Choltitz's motivations are unclear. Hitler's are not: he wanted vengeance. In the same order that he required the destruction of Paris, he stressed the need to hold onto Paris as long as possible, to defend the sites in the Pas de Calais, the base for the V-1 “Vengeance” weapons being launched almost haphazardly against London. When von Choltitz surrendered Paris to the Allies nearly intact on August 25, Hitler struck at Paris. Immediately, 120 Luftwaffe bombers dropped incendiary bombs, killing at least 50 people. The first lethal V-2 missiles are targeted, not on London, but Paris, with 22 rockets fired between September 7 and October 6, largely striking in the suburbs to no military effect whatsoever.

Intriguingly, General Eisenhower and the Allied high command had not wanted to take Paris. They realized – as any of their professional opponents could also see – that the need to control, feed, and otherwise supply a major city and its civilian population would place a major strain on their logistics, and impair the pursuit and destruction of German armed forces before they could reach relative safety back in Germany. A “field of ruins” would have been a warcrime of pointless defiance.

Why this essay? Why now?

As part of my interest in history is my focus on military history, which inevitably leads to accounts of military disasters. Within that are the “what the heck” moments? Just how did the instigators of this monumental FUBAR think it was going to turn out? The classic FUBAR occurred almost 100 years before the first use of the word, with The Charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War. (1854)

To which poesied Tennyson:

Someone had blundered.

Theirs not to make reply,

Theirs not to reason why,

Theirs but to do and die.

And then there was the poster, way back in Spencer's Gifts, under the black lights (ultraviolet). A mouse gives the finger to an eagle swooping down it. “Defiance” is defined in words next to the depiction. Pretty cool poster when you're 16. But over the years, I've spared a thought or two for the poster. And concluded the mouse is an idiot. Not brave. Not even foolhardy. Just stupid. Not only by getting himself into a situation he can't escape. But by just standing there, finger out, not running, he is making the eagle's job just that much easier. A pointless gesture. Heck, even in “Animal House” the Deltas' “futile and stupid gesture” is more productive than this. And there, of course, is the rub: our culture, and notably American culture, has enthroned and enobled the “futile and stupid gesture”, made pointless defiance a virtue. When faced with a host of options, many bad, some worse, why reject the one that gives the best possible outcome? Even if that best outcome sucks, why choose instead the worst result just for some non-tangible, transitory self-gratification? The answer is that culture has transformed pointless defiance, enshrouded it with the myth that, “Hey, maybe you'll win. In spite of everything, even though this act of defiance is misguided and stupid and almost 100% guaranteed not to succeed, you never know if you don't roll the dice.”

Of course we also have Samson: vain, vengeful, homicidal. His act of suicidal vengeance is praised, however, as the result of God hearing and answering Samson's prayers, incidentally beginning the deliverance of Samson's people from his enemies. A hero in spite of himself.

In these four vignettes, at least one actor decided for pointless defiance, for the futile and stupid gesture. In Mexico, the French Foreign Legionaires mimicked Napoleon's Guard - "La Garde meurt mais ne se rend pas!" ("The Guard dies but does not surrender!") but in so doing had no effect whatsoever on the French siege then underway. Had they accepted the quarter that was offered to them not once, not twice, but three times they would have lived with no impairment of French Imperial designs. Their commander forfeited his life and that of his men for a legend.

To the north a few years later, the Irish Americans Fenian dreams are something out of Gilbert & Sullivan, a light opera with cannons and rifle fire for percussion and woodwinds. One can talk lightly of the raids, which led to less than five dozen dead (both killed in action and mortally wounded) of 40,000 men engaged in total, and the brief nature of the scattered engagements over five years. The concept of exchanging a kidnapped Canada for a free Ireland was rankest fantasy. But the issues were dead serious, and were not solved or extinguished by the defeat of the raids but returned to their home in Hibernia, with American support, money and latterly weapons.

The Second Boer War (or Boer War to the British, as who wished to forget that they lost the first so quickly and decisively) was fought for notions of liberty on the one side, and imperial domination and gold on the other. For the Boers, the guerilla war was in the near term more tragic than pointless after the British responded with uncommon brutality. When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, just eight years after the Boer war, Afrikaner/Boer generals from that war became Prime Minister and War Minister. For the British, the gold gained was oddly tarnished with not just excessive military deaths but civilian blood as well, and pale in comparision to the overshadowing financial cost of the war.

Paris did not burn, but Berlin, Hamburg, Dresden, Warsaw and so many other cities did, without even considering the devastation wrought elsewhere, notably in Europe and Asia. But Hitler's object in Paris late August 1944 was naked, unadulterated vengeance, unexcused and in fact contrary to any military objective. We have only General von Choltitz's own words for why he did not carry out his orders for pointless destruction and defiance, and his words are sometimes contradictory, often unclear, and always self-serving. We must remain content with the result without false heroism and unwarranted praise.

So, that's why this subject. Why now? The events of November 3, 2020, to January 20, 2021 are too fresh to be proper subjects for history. For now, we must be satisfied with journalism. But they will lend themselves to history, soon. And when that time comes, it will be good to reflect on past follies and the trusim that while history does not repeat itself, it does rhyme.

© 2021 Alan J. Carlson Reproduction of this work for personal use permitted as long as the work is not modified and the source of the work is cited.

Book Review: Moral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II, by Michael Burleigh.

Synopsis: The Nazis were bad people who did bad things for bad reasons. The Soviets under Stalin were bad people who did bad things for one good reason. The Japanese did a lot of bad things, but since the legal definition of conspiracy is unfathomable, those things just happened – and some of them were good people who loved their families, so there's that. The Americans were good people who did good things but were too naive and unsophisticated to know why they did what they did. The British are good people who did good things for good reasons, except when they did bad things for good reasons, so those were good things too, really. The Italians changed sides so that 99% of the Fascists could escape punishment for the not so terribly bad things they did. The Croatian Ustashe are beneath notice, and while Polish and French resistance is remarkable, the Yugoslav Partisans turned out to be Commies, so there is no reason to acknowledge them.

Reinhold Neibuhr and Martin Niemöller can't hold a candle to CoE (Church of England) clergy when it comes to the theological implications of morality in wartime, so are justly ignored. Also, lawyers, and moral philosophers, the political “left,” the New York Times, and all other historians are ignorant. And you can tell whether someone is morally virtuous by their appearance and personal habits. Lastly, apparently there is no problem with using terms like “Apache-like” and Gypsy.

TL, DR: Hitler bad, Churchill good.

Overrated Classic: Fritz Fischer's Germany's Aims in the First World War

Fritz Fischer's Germany's Aims in the First World War is an acclaimed classic, usually cited for breaking with forty years of German accepted wisdom that, unlike in 1939, in 1914 Germany “slid” blamelessly into war (to quote UK PM Lloyd-George). That is to say, Fischer asserted iconoclastically that the German Reich bore "a substantial share of the historical responsibility for the outbreak of the general war." And this assertion, commonly accepted outside of Germany long before Fischer's 1961 pronouncement, is what gained Germany's Aims in the First World War such fame and notoriety – even though Fischer himself states in his book “It is not the purpose of this work (to debate) the question of war guilt.” p 87 And truly, what Fischer spends over 500 pages on is not war guilt, but an effort to show that the Second Reich sought to use the war to establish itself as a “world power,” through the political annexation of its nearest neighbors and the economic subordination of much of Europe into a Mitteleuropa.

Unfortunately for readability, Fischer pursues this goal by repetitive chronological rendering of state papers and the opinions of Germany's government officials and occasionally politicians and leading businessmen. Make no mistake, getting through this tome is a slog, one that is rarely rewarding.

Fischer's genuine thesis is buried halfway through the book: “Leading circles in Germany were convinced that only a victorious war ending in substantial gains would enable them to maintain their political and social order;” p. 329 Such a stance certainly explains the stubbornness with which the Emperor, Army (and Navy), and Reich and Prussian governments held to to arrogant war aims – domination of Belgium and Poland, exploitation of Romania, seizure of the Baltic, Ukraine, even Caucasus, and commandeering the mine fields of northeast France.

But Fischer's emptying of the German archives into his expose leads him astray, by overvaluing any and all documents that support his thesis of an unchecked German will to power. For example, he cites the views of the head of the German Colonial Association and the head of the Reich Colonial Office as proof of German war aims in Africa. p. 587 Bureaucratically, an organization will always advocate for its own narrow goals, irrespective of whether those goals serve the greater good. Without clear evidence that the goal was accepted by the state, such views are interesting, but not dispositive. One might as well say a child's wish for a pony proves the existence of the stable.

And again, Fischer proffers arguments such as that on page 603: “a long report (in June 1918) by the [Prussian] Ministry of State (was) one more testimony to Prussia's obstinate determination to expand....” It is more likely that the report is testimony to the inertia of bureaucracy, offering reports to the captain on how to arrange the deckchairs long after hitting the iceberg.

The past few years have seen numerous new books on the question of why the Great War broke out. Any of them, even the least of them, is a better contribution to the field than Fischer at this date.

Wag the Dog, Part II - The Media Copies Each Other's Exam Papers

USA Today, 1/29/17: "In one of three executive actions Saturday, President Trump reshuffled the National Security Council to include his chief strategist, Stephen Bannon, and limited the roles of the director of national intelligence and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
BBC: "The director of national intelligence and the joint chiefs will attend when discussions pertain to their areas. Under previous administrations, the director and joint chiefs attended all meetings of the NSC's inner circle, the principals' committee."

WaPo: "That memo also states that the director of national intelligence and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will sit on the principals committee only when the issues to be discussed pertain to their “responsibilities and expertise.” In the previous two administrations, both were included as regular attendees."

Ok, here's the relevant sentence from the 2009 and 2017 memos:

"The Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisers to the NSC, shall attend NSC meetings."

"The Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisers to the NSC, shall also attend NSC meetings."

Quick: Which is the 2009 memo, and which is from 2017? Bonus points - what is the difference, and what is its effect?

Digging even deeper, WaPo transposed the words quoted as "responsibilities and expertise" from the memo's discussion of the senior subcommittee (the PC), which "considers policy", to the NSC proper, which "advises the President." The roles are not the same, and the more limited PC role does always require direct intel and unformed military involvement in the discussion itself.

Wag the Dog

 I just (re-)read Obama's memo organizing the NSC, and the new one. The status of the DNI and the CJCS is essentially unchanged (the caveat is because the new memo describes the Prez, VP, and Secretaries as attendees at Council meetings, where Obama had those as Council members, with only advisers described as attending).

Bannon and (apparently) Kushner are added, which is both highly atypical and not surprising, for the same reason: until now, purely political types were kept out to minimize "Wag the Dog" scenarios.

The most interesting omission is the former memo's requirement that "The NSC shall meet regularly and as required."

https://www.lawfareblog.com/national-security...

From Bad to Simply Awful and Tendentious: No Simple Victory - World War II in Europe, 1939-1945, by Norman Davies

Lately, I've taken to reading the end of novels first, to see how the author reaches her conclusions. If only I had done that with Davies' 500 page No Simple Victory. I could have then tossed it aside as the tendentious work it is hours earlier, without wasting my time.

Nominally, Davies sets out to give a synthetic view of WW2 in Europe, and not focus simply on the efforts of the US and UK militaries. But the small and large factual errors pile up (see below), all under an assertion that the Soviet effort was so "overwhelming" as to completely overshadow the Western effort. Frankly, any book on WW2 Europe that dismissively asserts that "D-Day does not figure among the top ten battles of the war" is seriously in error.

How does Davies figure the significance of battles? By counting up the number of military deaths, primarily, secondarily by counting the number of divisions, and lastly by assigning a duration to the battle. All of which, perhaps accidently but more likely by surreptitious intention, assigns more weight to the inefficient way of battle practiced by the Soviet Army, which created and destroyed (understrength) divisions by the hundreds, as compared to the West, which created a few score divisions, each quite powerful on its own and generally overstrength, not just compared to a Soviet division (which it would overawe, one on one), but even compared to its "authorized" strength, if measured just prior to a campaign.

To Davies' way of thought, a battle between 300,000 men on both sides that kills half of each force over two months is far more significant than a battle between the same forces, where the victor loses only 5,000 men in a week of fighting to vanquish its foe, which loses 20,000 dead and 200,000 captured. In fact, it would be either 150,000 divided by 25,000 = six times more significant; or it is eight times more significant (300,000 men each force x two forces x two months = 1,200,000 "man-months) cf. 300,000 men each force x two forces x 1/4 month = 150,000 man-months). Yet in the real world the first is a bloody stalemate, the second a brilliant victory.

Or look at Davies' list of battles and campaigns (p. 25): of the top four battles, two (Barbarossa and Kiev 1941) were won by the strategic loser (Germany), and a third (Leningrad) was a stalemate - and in Davies' own assessment, a fight that Soviets should have declined by withdrawing from the city.

Another notable error is Davies' assertion (page 109) that the Axis "cut its losses" in Tunisia in 1943. German military dead in North Africa in 1943 were slight (c. 8,500), so Davies' method would have this as insignificant. Never mind the surrender of over 200,000 Axis troops ( 12/ German) - more than surrendered at Stalingrad. Never mind the loss of 40% of the Luftwaffe (11/42 - 5/43, in N. Africa and the Med).  The small errors are too numerous to recapitulate (one sticks too hard not to mention: B-24s were built by Consolidated, not North American).

I'm not sure what Davies' goal was in writing NSV. But given his reputation as a fervent advocate for Poland (he was made a Polish citizen on the basis of his prior work), I believe he wants to fault his homeland, the UK, for failing in its September goal of restoring Poland's freedom within its 1939 borders.

Book Review: The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain's Rush to War 1914, by Douglas Newton

Newton delivers a solid piece of historical research, exploding the myths of why, how, and importantly when Britain decided on war in 1914. The classic myth is that Britain only decided on war AFTER Germany invaded “plucky little” Belgium on August 4th, declaring war late that evening. Newton shows that the very senior members of Britain's government, acting without Parliament or even the larger Cabinet, decided on war August 2^nd, in support of the “Ententes” with Russia and France, themselves designed not to constrain Germany, but to de-conflict the British Empire's colonial holdings in Africa and Asia.

In this account, PM Asquith, Foreign Minister Grey, and First Sea Lord Churchill controlled the descent into war. Only Asquith's motivation is explored in depth, stressing his desire to keep his Liberal government in power. (Ironically, a coalition with the Conservatives was unavoidable in May 1915, resulting from poor management of the war.)

Newton also all too briefly sketches the nascent opposition to war, nipped in the bud by the heavy-handed rush to war.

Newton's writing style is solid but academic, and the book is not a”page-turner.” It is however a useful counter to the “fairy tale” of Britain being forced into war by “dire necessity.” At the least, any reader interested in the origins of World War One should read Newton's last two paragraphs, Radical Recriminations, and Conclusion,where he gives an excellent summary of his arguments.

Book Review: An Unsatisfying Account of the Naval Battles off Guadalcanal in 1942

Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal. James D. Hornfischer.

I really wanted to like this book. I enjoyed immensely Hornfischer's The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, a gripping account of the succesful defiance shown by the smallest warships of the US Navy when faced with a devasting surface attack led by the warship in the world, the Japanese battleship Yamato, off Leyte Gulf in October 1944. But Hornfischer's technique of showing the reactions of sailors and officers to the confusion and terror of battle in one encounter doesn't work that well when applied to an entire months-long campaign, with seven major battles and near-continous skirmishes. In reading Neptune's Inferno, I repeatedly lost track of individuals and even entire ships - and I have read numerous accounts of these events before. A novice to naval warfare would be even more lost, as Hornfischer ignores technology in favor of personalities - except when he doesn't, with unexplicated references to "turret 1" and such.

There are disconcerting editing mistakes as well: Two examples, page 283: "at murderously close range, sixty-two thousand yards,..." No, that's 35 miles; should be “hundred yards.” Page 284: "Bruce McCandless at the flagship's (San Francisco) conn called to Captain Jenkins, "The Atlanta's turning left. Should I follow her?" Really? Because Jenkins is captain of the Atlanta - how and why would McCandless on the San Francisco's bridge call out to him?

I know I am outlier here, but Neptune's Inferno's narrative left me confused, its exposition of events was superficial, and its analysis was simply missing in all the action. For example, Hornficher properly notes that the anti-aircraft cruiser USS Atlanta was sent to join a surface action group, while the US battleships were retained on carrier and escort convoy duty - a perfect mismatch of roles and capabilities - but does little to explicate this command error.

I will go back to Samuel E. Morison's official history The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942-February 1943 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II) , Eric Hammels' Decision at Sea and Carrier Strike, and Osprey Publishing's The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942: Clash for Supremacy in the Pacific (Campaign).

Book Review: The Dead Hand - The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy

David E. Hoffman's Dead Hand  is both well-researched and well-written - but in its focus on Gorbachev and Reagan, it lacks analysis. When faced with the question, why did  Gorbachev continue funding the hidden, and quite illegal, Soviet biological weapons program while seeking the complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, Hoffman shrugs. Hoffman never raises the question of why the Soviets hated Reagan's SDI ("Star Wars" - ballistic missile defense). Nor does it occur to Hoffman to examine what Reagan did, and could have done, to push his Administration to support his goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I don't have a good answer for the last - but Hoffman, as a political reporter, could have presumably done more on the question.

The penultimate chapter of Dead Hand hints at why the Soviets, if not Gorbachev himself, kept the biological weapons program. Namely, it becomes a war-winning weapon in the absence of opposing WMD systems, particularly if the weapons are deployed on the scale envisioned by the Soviets. Compliance with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWTC) is still, in 2015, nearly impossible to verify, given the BWTC's lack of any verification protocol. As shown by Aum Shinrikyo's 1994 and 1995 (Tokyo subway) attacks, biological weapons are comparatively easy to acquire and deliver, with research and production of the weapons easily concealed.

Conversely, Hoffman never considers why the Soviets feared a viable ballistic missile defense (BMD). Hoffman takes Reagan at his word, that BMD would be a passive shield. Hoffman never considers that shields and armor exist not to preserve the combatant against repeated, unreturned blows, but to enable the armored fighter to deliver a decisive attack while surviving the exchange.

Let's consider two countries, perfect reciprocals. Both have 1000 missiles with 3 nuclear warheads each. Each has 100 cities with 1 million population each; each city takes 5 warheads to destroy. Likewise, each missile is in a silo, which takes two warheads to destroy. Each missile has 95% accuracy against a city, but only 
60% against a silo. (You have to hit much closer to a hardened silo to destroy it, compared to a city.)

Without BMD, a first strike against silos leaves 100 to 200 missiles to retaliate. The retaliation essentially destroys 90% of the attacker's cities.  If the first striker has BMD to destroy that retaliation, it can strike without injury to itself. And if the BMD has to handle 100 to 200 missiles, rather than 1000, the task is simplified and the efficacy of the shield improved.

The world is safer with fewer nuclear weapons, and will be safer with even fewer still. But the last phase, from several hundred to zero, will be tricky - and much trickier than the Dead Hand would lead one to believe.

Book Review: Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I, by Michael S. Neiberg

Did you know:

a) most Europeans did not want a general war in 1914?
b) most Europeans did not expect the war to last more than a few weeks or at most months after it did start?
c) war causes privation, and seeing the dead and wounded from war is emotionally painful?

If your answer to all three is "yes" - skip Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I, by Michael S. Neiberg.

Atomic Bombs on Japan - Unnecessary, or Even a War Crime?

Sorry, but I utterly disagree. Full disclosure: if not for the sudden end to the war in the Pacific, unforeseeable without the use of the atomic bomb, I probably wouldn't even be writing this. My father narrowly escaped death off Okinawa, where his lightly-armed, unarmored, and highly vulnerable merchant ship was repeatedly targeted by kamikaze attacks. When the war ended, he was scheduled to return to the Pacific, where the Japanese had five times as many kamikaze attacks readied - Allied planners estimated that 1/3 to 1/2 of the invasion force could be lost before landing.

The last straw was not Soviet attacks against the Japanese army occupying Manchuria, which was not considered a core part of the Japanese Empire. Starting in 1942, most of the Japanese army in Manchuria had been transferred to fight the US; what remained was raw recruits, understrength and poorly equipped. Indeed, in his speech announcing surrender, Emperor Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings, but not once to the Soviet attack, a view he repeated to General MacArthur in September 1945.

I am at the forefront of those calling for further sharp reductions in American (and other states') nuclear weapons. I am proud to be considered a member of the US delegation that negotiated the New START Treaty, which cut the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and their launchers for both the US and Russia. I am proud of the work I did to push for a treaty ending production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (Pakistan continues to block work on such an agreement.) . I have written both of my Senators, and my Congressman, urging them to support the P5+1 Iran deal. I have made my support for that deal very public. I even question whether US interests in the Pacific and Asia were of a such a degree as to risk provoking war with Japan (my internal jury is still out on that one). But I do not let my strong, unshakeable stance against the continued construction and possession of nuclear weapons blind me to their great utility in ending the horrors that would have ensued had World War II been prosecuted after August 1945.

Book Review: A Mad Catastrophe - The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Hapsburg Empire

Geoffrey Wawro's book is a useful addition to the literature on the outbreak of World War One. The first quarter of the book examines how Austria entered the war with such a weak force; man for man, perhaps the weakest of any combatant. Wawro argues that it was Hungarian obstinacy, facilitated by the 1867 Compromise, itself supported by Bismarck who was keen to guard against Austrian schemes of revenge for their 1866 humiliation at the hands of Prussia. Penny-pinching led to shortages of rifles, machine guns, artillery and shells, and low pay for officers, leading to mediocre leadership.

It's a convincing argument, reading the remainder of the book, as general after general, most notably the army's leader, the inept and maudlin Chief of Staff Conrad, "lead" their troops from comfortable chateaus far, far to the rear. Three (!) invasions of Serbia in 1914, which had armed the assassins of the Austrian emperor's heir, were thrown back with heavy losses on both sides. There, as against Russia, only German intervention stabilized the front.

I found the successive accounts of military debacle after debacle exhausting and repetitive. But think of those who fought in them!

I do wish that Wawro had spent more time on the "why" of Austrian decision-making, both in politics before the war and militarily after July 1914. Wawro explicates the July crisis as quickly as he can, and falls into the trap of calling the ultimatum "degrading," mischaracterizing the key point as calling for Austrian officials to "lead an inquiry (on Serbian soil)" into the assassination - the ultimatum in fact calls for the cooperation and participation of Austria in Serbian led actions. But for Wawro's book, this is a sidelight, and thus a more excusable error than in some other accounts.

The maps included are useful, and the photographs add welcome interest.

Book Review: The Lost History of 1914

Jack Beatty has taken a hard look at the "inevitability" of World War One, and deftly refuted the argument. The core of his book is the first six chapters, each looking at one of the major combatant countries and how close each came to NOT entering onto military action in Europe in 1914 (or 1917). The six are Germany, Russia, England, United States, Austria-Hungary, and France.  

The most interesting arguments are those on England, the US, and France. As any serious scholar of England knows, until the very last days of July 1914, it looked far more likely that the British Expeditionary Force would go to Ireland, as civil war broke out between Protestants and Catholics over Home Rule, than to France in the wake of Germany's attack through Belgium. 

If not for a nationalist editor publishing scandalous but true accounts of the skirt-chasing Minister of Finance, Joseph Callaux, Mme Callaux would have no cause to shoot and kill the newspaperman - derailing her husband's otherwise easy electoral victory and appointment as Prime Minister. With the renowned Jean Jaures as his foreign minister, and Callaux's track record of successfully mollifying German demands, it is unlikely that war on the western front would have broken out.

The most fascinating chapter is on the US, as Beatty underscores the anti-imperialist stance of President Wilson, and his break with the Taft policy of supporting Mexico's dictator, the favorite of Wall Street. Beatty shows how Wilson's motives in landing troops in Veracruz, Mexico in April 1914 was to support the rebels, by blocking arm shipments to the president of Mexico - but the fact of American troops on Mexican soil was portrayed as renewed imperialism. Provoked by Villa's 1916 raid on Columbus, NM, Wilson sent General Pershing on a wild-goose chase after the rebel formerly supported by Wilson. The renewed presence of American troops on Mexican soil prompted closer ties between Mexico and Imperial Germany, culminating in the disastrous Zimmermann telegram of 1917, promising Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to be restored to Mexico. Beatty argues that the telegram was even more decisive than the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare against American merchant ships in generating a fever for war in the heartland.

There is much more in Beatty's book; I have not even touched on the last four chapters, covering the last months of 1914, as the spade replaces the machine gun as the key instrument of war.  Beatty's book is well-written, and well worth the time and attention of anyone interested in how the war could have been avoided.

McCain's BFF Running for President

So, Sen. Lindsey Graham has announced that he will announce on June 1 "whether" he is running for President. On the one hand, as a (up until now anyway) lifelong bachelor, he would be only the second such to enter the Oval Office. OOTH, ... yech.

He says that he is running for the office because "he's been more right than wrong on foreign policy." Really? Because he also said the 2003 Iraq war was the result of "faulty intelligence ... but (with) faulty intelligence the entire world believed." Right. That's why we renamed Freedom fries French fries, to honor our Gallic allies in the 2003 invasion. The solid, nay unanimous UN Security Council vote for a resolution authorizing military action. Ambassador Wilson alerting us all to Iraq's purchases of uranium ore ("yellowcake"). Hans Blix coming back from Iraq and assuring us all that Saddam is just weeks away from having a nuke. The Department of Energy and State's Intelligence and Research (INR) agencies guaranteeing that the aluminum tubes were for centrifuges, not conventional military items. Top US General Shinseki stating that a small force would be ok, we "would be welcomed as liberators."  Oh, right. NONE OF THAT HAPPENED. Rather, just the opposite. 

Graham, a lawyer and USAF JAG, has also recently proclaimed in Iowa that, "If I'm President of the United States and you're thinkin' about joining al-Qaeda or ISIL -- anybody thinkin' about that -- I'm not going to call a judge, I'm going to call a drone and we will kill you." Which further demonstrates his firm grasp on the rule of law and reality.  Or not.

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article21166422.html#storylink=cpy

Book Review: Profiles in Folly - History's Worst Decisions and Why They Went Wrong

Alan Axelrod's breezy and quick-reading book from 2008 covers 35 of the "worst decisions" in history, often in wartime, from 1250 BC (the Trojan horse) to 2005 (Hurricane Katrina). (The decisions are very Euro-centric.) As Axelrod himself notes, this is not "objective history," a balanced look at why decisions were made. He is particularly (if justifiably) hard on the Bush-Cheney administration, which gets tarred four times (space shuttle, Iraq war (twice), hurricane Katrina), with a glancing blow from Enron as well. 

Axelrod formats his stories well into six parts, each entitled "The Decision to _________." Specifically: Gamble and Hope; Manipulate; Leap (Without Looking); Retreat; Destroy; and Drift. While most of the stories are familiar, Axelrod's ability to cut away extraneous matter makes each a strong example of the section's theme, and reinforces the role of obstinance, stupidity, cupidity and ignorance in bad decision-making. 

I would only take exception to one account, that of Austria's decision to present its ultimatum to Serbia in 1914. Largely, I see the faulty account by Axelrod as rooted in his use of the very popular, but erroneous, Guns of August (by Barbara Tuchman), as one of only two sources.  Consequently, the severity of the ultimatum is over-stated.

I look forward to reading more of Axelrod's many books.

Book Review: Warrior Race - A History of the British at War

I should have guessed from the back cover: "telling anecdote," "storyteller," "lively anecdote," "entertaining," "anecdotes are wonderful," "personal vignettes." Yep, despite its subtitle, this is not a history, which requires thematic analysis, but a compilation of stories. General Wolfe's capture of Quebec in 1759 is here not important for its decisive effect on North American and world history, but because of the maudlin, "inspiring," portrait of his death at the climax of the battle. Similarly, Trafalgar is not the decisive check to Napoleon, but the source material for an "heroic" depiction of Admiral Nelson dying on, and at the point of, Victory. Bernard Montgomery does not figure at all for his role as the quintessential leader of Britain's armies in World War 2, but for wrongly guessing as a lieutenant in 1914 that the war would be quick and decisive.  

Author Lawrence James switches his focus back and forth as he brushes his own picture of the effect of war on Britain since Roman times. The result is several books between two covers. England's interference in Ireland is reasonably well-covered, but India gets scant coverage and Africa almost none. The RAF's continued desire for upper class officers as "natural leaders" is noted, but no discussion is made of how British officers interacted with so-called "native" troops, e.g., Indians or Africans. We do get a lot on the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the presence of barflies and camp-followers (i.e., "amateur" prostitutes) in 1940-45 UK - but not the camp-follower's experience.

The inside dustcover states James' subject as: "the question of British national identity and character." Close. I'd say English rather than British. This is a book for the Anglophile, narrowly cast, who is already well read in the chronology and history of England's wars, campaigns, battles and leaders, who wants the steady succession of vignettes from on low presented here.