Resignation of Political Ambassadors: Tempest in a Teapot (So Far)

Honestly, I feel the NYT and others have blown the resignation of political ambassadors out of proportion. (NB: I retired from State after 25 years as a Foreign Service Officer.) Some media, even Reuters, have abbreviated this as "all ambassadors appointed by Obama" are to resign. Well, all ambassadors, career and political, are appointed by the President. Traditionally, ALL "political" ambassadors are asked to resign before a new President takes office - but the career folks stay in place.

E.g.: There are three (sometimes four) ambassadors in Geneva - UN, Disarmament (CD), WTO (Human Rights). In Early 2009, the UN ambassador left on his private plane on the morning on January 20. My boss (Disarmament) left a few days before. Even though our new boss was a career FSO, she was not sworn in until March 2010. We functioned fine in the 15-month gap, facilitating in Geneva a successful seven-month negotiation of the New START treaty, cutting nukes 30%. So things get done without ambassadors in place.

Remember too that many (way too many, IMO) of the political ambassadors got the nod by raising campaign funds, and have little to no qualification for the job. (These are carried by the career staff.) Obama's political amb to Luxembourg was so awful her two senior career officers transferred to Iraq and Afghanistan! They are also rich (see Geneva amb & private jet, above). Every one of these should have started packing November 9th.

The folks I feel sorry for are the management folks who have political appointees who thought they could stay on - and now have to scramble to get them out the door. And of course for millions of Americans, not nearly so well off, who will be harmed by the policies of the next two years.

And all bets are off if the new powers-that-be start going after career national security folks, in State, intel, and defense.

Warning: No simple answers ahead.

Greg Palast, reported on RT, reports on the vote-suppression caused by the "Crosscheck" program, designed by GOP Kansas SecState Kris Kobach to suppress registration of likely Dem voters in the guise of removing duplicate registrations. Now, I like Greg Palast, who does solid fieldwork and writes articulately. But I see no reason to say that "X" is the reason the election came out the way it did - so "A", "B", "Y", and "Z" are irrelevant. That's stage-magic, and it doesn't matter if the stage is PEOTUS' Twitter or RT's (Russia Today before they started to obscure Russian government funding - and control).

Remember that this story is in fact bigger than the election and hacking of the DNC. The sanctions announced at the end of the year also responded to: "a pattern of harassment of our diplomats overseas that has increased over the last four years, including a significant increase in the last 12 months. This harassment has involved arbitrary police stops, physical assault, and the broadcast on State TV of personal details about our personnel that put them at risk. In addition, the Russian Government has impeded our diplomatic operations by, among other actions: forcing the closure of 28 American Corners which hosted cultural programs and English-language teaching;" 

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/12/266145.htm

Ending Naked Partisanship and Hostility

In 1994 and 1995, mortar rounds smashed into the Markale market in Sarajevo, Bosnia, killing 68 and 43 civilians, respectively. Scores were wounded. Immediately, and to this day, the Serbs responsible for the attacks have baldly asserted that the Muslims fired the rounds, killing their own in a bid for international sympathy.

Repeated, exhaustive court trials have rejected the Serb claims, and concluded the rounds came from Serb army guns. As noted author Tim Judah notes: "The Serbian argument was grotesque, since what they wanted the world to believe was that of the hundreds of thousands of shells they fired, none had ever hurt anyone."

I find a repeat of the same willingness to exonerate allies and fault opponents occurring here in recent days. It doesn't appear that anyone has died at the hands of others in the few days since the election, but unless partisans on all sides stop rushing to both judgment and exoneration, and stop engaging in hateful attacks and pointless demonstrations of, shall we say, political fealty, that's where we're headed.

There has been, beyond contention, a rise in bigoted, racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, and anti-Muslim language and actions in the last days. That is and must be unacceptable.

Both sides (all sides?) can and should be taking peaceful, practical, pragmatic steps to protect and advance their interests, steps that don't insult and belittle, and which don't continue the intolerant, confrontational, offensive rhetoric of the campaign.

From Bad to Simply Awful and Tendentious: No Simple Victory - World War II in Europe, 1939-1945, by Norman Davies

Lately, I've taken to reading the end of novels first, to see how the author reaches her conclusions. If only I had done that with Davies' 500 page No Simple Victory. I could have then tossed it aside as the tendentious work it is hours earlier, without wasting my time.

Nominally, Davies sets out to give a synthetic view of WW2 in Europe, and not focus simply on the efforts of the US and UK militaries. But the small and large factual errors pile up (see below), all under an assertion that the Soviet effort was so "overwhelming" as to completely overshadow the Western effort. Frankly, any book on WW2 Europe that dismissively asserts that "D-Day does not figure among the top ten battles of the war" is seriously in error.

How does Davies figure the significance of battles? By counting up the number of military deaths, primarily, secondarily by counting the number of divisions, and lastly by assigning a duration to the battle. All of which, perhaps accidently but more likely by surreptitious intention, assigns more weight to the inefficient way of battle practiced by the Soviet Army, which created and destroyed (understrength) divisions by the hundreds, as compared to the West, which created a few score divisions, each quite powerful on its own and generally overstrength, not just compared to a Soviet division (which it would overawe, one on one), but even compared to its "authorized" strength, if measured just prior to a campaign.

To Davies' way of thought, a battle between 300,000 men on both sides that kills half of each force over two months is far more significant than a battle between the same forces, where the victor loses only 5,000 men in a week of fighting to vanquish its foe, which loses 20,000 dead and 200,000 captured. In fact, it would be either 150,000 divided by 25,000 = six times more significant; or it is eight times more significant (300,000 men each force x two forces x two months = 1,200,000 "man-months) cf. 300,000 men each force x two forces x 1/4 month = 150,000 man-months). Yet in the real world the first is a bloody stalemate, the second a brilliant victory.

Or look at Davies' list of battles and campaigns (p. 25): of the top four battles, two (Barbarossa and Kiev 1941) were won by the strategic loser (Germany), and a third (Leningrad) was a stalemate - and in Davies' own assessment, a fight that Soviets should have declined by withdrawing from the city.

Another notable error is Davies' assertion (page 109) that the Axis "cut its losses" in Tunisia in 1943. German military dead in North Africa in 1943 were slight (c. 8,500), so Davies' method would have this as insignificant. Never mind the surrender of over 200,000 Axis troops ( 12/ German) - more than surrendered at Stalingrad. Never mind the loss of 40% of the Luftwaffe (11/42 - 5/43, in N. Africa and the Med).  The small errors are too numerous to recapitulate (one sticks too hard not to mention: B-24s were built by Consolidated, not North American).

I'm not sure what Davies' goal was in writing NSV. But given his reputation as a fervent advocate for Poland (he was made a Polish citizen on the basis of his prior work), I believe he wants to fault his homeland, the UK, for failing in its September goal of restoring Poland's freedom within its 1939 borders.

Measure Three Times?

My garage installer told me of a guy who had ordered a garage door that he'd put in himself. Said he wanted a 17' by 9' door. Installer wondered about that, said almost all doors are 16' by 8' - and that seventeen feet wide (5.2m) was particularly unheard of. Guy insisted he had measured it three times - 17 feet.

So they delivered it, and it was clearly too big - and no easy way to cut a metal door down. Guy pulls out his measuring tape. Installer notices it has been repaired. Guy says, yeah, the end broke off, so I cut off a foot and reattached it. Installer replies, yeah, and you forgot to subtract that foot when you measured for the new door.

Book Review: The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain's Rush to War 1914, by Douglas Newton

Newton delivers a solid piece of historical research, exploding the myths of why, how, and importantly when Britain decided on war in 1914. The classic myth is that Britain only decided on war AFTER Germany invaded “plucky little” Belgium on August 4th, declaring war late that evening. Newton shows that the very senior members of Britain's government, acting without Parliament or even the larger Cabinet, decided on war August 2^nd, in support of the “Ententes” with Russia and France, themselves designed not to constrain Germany, but to de-conflict the British Empire's colonial holdings in Africa and Asia.

In this account, PM Asquith, Foreign Minister Grey, and First Sea Lord Churchill controlled the descent into war. Only Asquith's motivation is explored in depth, stressing his desire to keep his Liberal government in power. (Ironically, a coalition with the Conservatives was unavoidable in May 1915, resulting from poor management of the war.)

Newton also all too briefly sketches the nascent opposition to war, nipped in the bud by the heavy-handed rush to war.

Newton's writing style is solid but academic, and the book is not a”page-turner.” It is however a useful counter to the “fairy tale” of Britain being forced into war by “dire necessity.” At the least, any reader interested in the origins of World War One should read Newton's last two paragraphs, Radical Recriminations, and Conclusion,where he gives an excellent summary of his arguments.

The US Supreme Court and Historical Nonsense

There's a lot of blather (particularly from Cruz and Rubio, but also McConnell and other supposed "conservatives") about there being "precedent" and "tradition" on not appointing/confirming Supreme Court justices in a presidential election year. The fact is, a vacancy just doesn't occur very often; most justices retire or resign, and they've chosen to leave when a president they like is in office, and not in a presidential election year.

Let's use the 80 year time frame put forth by Rubio: 1936-2016. Thirty justices chose to step down; ten died in office. Probability says two (and half) should have died in a year evenly divisible by four. In fact, Scalia is the first SC justice to DIE IN A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR IN 80 YEARS.

Ok, Rubio, Cruz, et al.: it's not precedent or tradition if it JUST HASN'T HAPPENED BEFORE.