Tuesday, February 3, 2015
Transient Gems
Minneapolis got 2 inches (5 cm) of light, fluffy snow this afternoon. Now, under the streetlights and full moon, it is as if every surface was dusted with a thousand small fairy gems, with shimmers and reflections. Added bonus: the snow squeaks underfoot!
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
History without Analysis
The Month That Changed the World: July 1914, by Gordon Martel. 2014.
Gordon Martel, in his The Month That Changed the World: July 1914, has set out a chronological narrative of the actions taken by European government officials, largely those in the foreign ministries of the Great Powers, in the last week of prior to the outbreak of the Great War. In a sense, Martel's book is Luigi Albertini (The Origins of the War of 1914) writ small. Martel avoids assigning guilt for the war, and eschews judging the decisions of his characters. In his last chapter, he castigates those historians who explore the "what ifs" of 1914, decisions that if made differently may have avoided war.
Martel's book strikes me as incomplete. In focusing on the senior foreign ministry officials and heads of state, he gives the impression that foreign policy is made in a vacuum occupied solely by those gentlemen. More serious is his exclusion of any serious investigation of why Vienna persisted in its assumption that Russia would not take military action against Austria-Hungary, right up through Russian mobilization and Germany's declaration of war against Russia (even before Vienna had so declared). A key figure in that blindness is the Austrian military Chief of Staff Conrad. Perhaps as Conrad is not a diplomat, Martel figured he was not part of his thesis.
The biggest weakness is the book's lack of analysis, of judgment. Martel has written another book, The Origins of the First World War (1987), and perhaps that book would be more satisfactory. As it is, The Month That Changed the World: July 1914 feels like research notes, carefully arranged in chronological order.
I do recommend Clark's The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.
Gordon Martel, in his The Month That Changed the World: July 1914, has set out a chronological narrative of the actions taken by European government officials, largely those in the foreign ministries of the Great Powers, in the last week of prior to the outbreak of the Great War. In a sense, Martel's book is Luigi Albertini (The Origins of the War of 1914) writ small. Martel avoids assigning guilt for the war, and eschews judging the decisions of his characters. In his last chapter, he castigates those historians who explore the "what ifs" of 1914, decisions that if made differently may have avoided war.
Martel's book strikes me as incomplete. In focusing on the senior foreign ministry officials and heads of state, he gives the impression that foreign policy is made in a vacuum occupied solely by those gentlemen. More serious is his exclusion of any serious investigation of why Vienna persisted in its assumption that Russia would not take military action against Austria-Hungary, right up through Russian mobilization and Germany's declaration of war against Russia (even before Vienna had so declared). A key figure in that blindness is the Austrian military Chief of Staff Conrad. Perhaps as Conrad is not a diplomat, Martel figured he was not part of his thesis.
The biggest weakness is the book's lack of analysis, of judgment. Martel has written another book, The Origins of the First World War (1987), and perhaps that book would be more satisfactory. As it is, The Month That Changed the World: July 1914 feels like research notes, carefully arranged in chronological order.
I do recommend Clark's The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.
Sunday, December 21, 2014
Failing Kindergarten
For 25 years, my job consisted in large of part of sitting down with people and encouraging genuine dialog, GIVE and take, to settle sometimes horrendous challenges without the use of force. Maybe I'm just getting old, or perhaps just tired of getting annoyed and angry, but we're not going to make our lives better, all of our lives better, if we cling to the overly human tendency to "otherize" people we don't know, and refuse to engage in dialog, to see others (even those we do know) as just after our slice of the pie.
Let those with issues and concerns talk, truly talk, to one another. And work to make the pie bigger and shared out fairly.
I hope that's my last word on the subject.
Let those with issues and concerns talk, truly talk, to one another. And work to make the pie bigger and shared out fairly.
I hope that's my last word on the subject.
Friday, November 28, 2014
July 1914 and the "Draconian, Unacceptable" Austrian Ultimatum
Post hoc ergo propter hoc
I am reading another book on the outbreak of World War I (July 1914: Countdown to War, by Sean McMeekin), and again there is the assertion that Austria drafted its ultimatum to Serbia so as to ensure that it would be rejected, leading to war between the two states (although not inevitably a Europe-wide conflagration). The usual clauses are cited:
I am reading another book on the outbreak of World War I (July 1914: Countdown to War, by Sean McMeekin), and again there is the assertion that Austria drafted its ultimatum to Serbia so as to ensure that it would be rejected, leading to war between the two states (although not inevitably a Europe-wide conflagration). The usual clauses are cited:
5. to agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy;
6. to institute a judicial inquiry against every participant in the conspiracy of the twenty-eighth of June who may be found in Serbian territory; the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government delegated for this purpose will take part in the proceedings held for this purpose;
McMeekin asserts: "No sovereign state could reasonably be expected to turn over the operation of her police and justice systems to representatives of an outside and hostile power." McMeekin's summary of the clauses' effect is typical for the genre. But still wrong. The ultimatum doesn't demand the usurpation of Serbian state organs in favor of Imperial and Royal (i.e., Austro-Hungarian -AH) state organs, not even in the present investigation, limited to the assassination of the heir-designate to the AH throne and the associated movement. It requests only that Belgrade permit the involvement of AH officials in those proceedings. Vienna did not ask for control over, or even a veto over, those proceedings. Just direct participation.
Surely, in hindsight, such a minor infringement on Serbia's sovereignty would have been preferable to the occupation of the entire state by hostile forces for over two years, and the deaths of 750,000 to 1,250,000 Serbs - out of a population of only 4.6 million! Let alone the millions of other deaths globally from 1914 to 1918.
Surely, in hindsight, such a minor infringement on Serbia's sovereignty would have been preferable to the occupation of the entire state by hostile forces for over two years, and the deaths of 750,000 to 1,250,000 Serbs - out of a population of only 4.6 million! Let alone the millions of other deaths globally from 1914 to 1918.
Simply put, to argue once again that since Belgrade rejected the clauses proves that no state could have agreed to them, and therefore Vienna meant for the ultimatum to be rejected in order to provide a casus belli, is an example of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.
As to why Belgrade refused the ultimatum: clearly, the Serbs did not expect such a ruinous war. Presumably they expected the head of Hungarian government, Count Tisza, to check the rush to war, or some other intervention to halt Vienna's military involvement in the Balkans, as happened in 1912 and 1913 during the First and Second Balkan Wars.
Update I: A few chapters later (the book is arranged chronologically), McMeekin asserts that Serbia rejected the ultimatum on the direction of Russia, who also instructed Serbia to not defend Belgrade from the Austrian army. This appears to be part and parcel of McMeekin's thesis that Tsarist Russia bears the "war guilt" for 1914 (not Germany), and Russia was looking for a casus belli to seize the Straits in Turkey. In any event, why would Serbia yield her sovereignty to Russia and territory to Austria, rather than accept Austria's lesser demands?
Update II: So, I did finish the book. I can't really suggest that anyone else do so. McMeekin has no discernable professional experience outside of the writing and teaching of history, which is to say he is out of depth writing about politics, let alone diplomacy and military affairs, as he does repeatedly in July 1914: Countdown to War.
The real kicker is his Epilogue: The Question of Responsibility. First he absolves Germany and Austria on the grounds that their initial offensives (vs Belgium and Serbia) were so poorly coordinated with each other as to prove the states could not have premeditated such a war. I respond that planning can easily include bad and incomplete planning.
He then faults Germany for attacking through Belgium, and assumes that since the "Schlieffen Plan" failed to knock France out of of the war while bringing Britain in, that it could not have possibly worked. McMeekin ends his narrative on August 4th, with the commencement of hostilities. So he ignores that the key fault with the German plan of attack in 1914 is that it required France to repeat the errors of 1870 by engaging in a decisive battle too far forward. The fault is magnified by a much larger French army than in 1905, when the German plans were first drawn up. (McMeekin also entirely ignores the existence of multiple war plans.)
McMeekin doesn't stop there. At the very end, with no foundation or analysis, he asserts: "As indicated by their earlier mobilizations (especially Russia's), in 1914 France and Russia were far more eager to fight than Germany ...." To argue that the time of mobilization indicates which countries are to bear the guilt of war, requires more than mere assertion. McMeekin's story assumes that the leaders of 1914 had neither intelligence (smarts) nor intelligence (information). The leaders of Germany, France and Russia all knew that Germany could mobilize the fastest of the three, Russia the slowest. All assumed (wrongly, but unanimously) that interstate war in 1914 would move at the pace of Prussia's wars in 1864, 1866 and 1870 - and that a failure to deploy reserves would allow an opponent to deliver a knock-out blow in the opening weeks. Once war appeared inevitable, Russia had to mobilize first, given its vast size and backward (if improving) rail system. Germany's interior lines and highly efficient rail and military staff system allowed it to decide and go last. McMeekin earlier notes that the political leadership in all three countries were hesitant to declare mobilization. But in the Epilogue he only recalls the hesitations of Germany's political leaders.
Did Russia and Germany make political and diplomatic errors in July 1914. Absolutely. So did all the other European states. Did Germany have grandiose war aims? Absolutely. So did other combatants - and Japan, Serbia, France, Italy all attained much of theirs. McMeekin's account is unsatisfying, incomplete, and unsatisfactory.
As to why Belgrade refused the ultimatum: clearly, the Serbs did not expect such a ruinous war. Presumably they expected the head of Hungarian government, Count Tisza, to check the rush to war, or some other intervention to halt Vienna's military involvement in the Balkans, as happened in 1912 and 1913 during the First and Second Balkan Wars.
Update I: A few chapters later (the book is arranged chronologically), McMeekin asserts that Serbia rejected the ultimatum on the direction of Russia, who also instructed Serbia to not defend Belgrade from the Austrian army. This appears to be part and parcel of McMeekin's thesis that Tsarist Russia bears the "war guilt" for 1914 (not Germany), and Russia was looking for a casus belli to seize the Straits in Turkey. In any event, why would Serbia yield her sovereignty to Russia and territory to Austria, rather than accept Austria's lesser demands?
Update II: So, I did finish the book. I can't really suggest that anyone else do so. McMeekin has no discernable professional experience outside of the writing and teaching of history, which is to say he is out of depth writing about politics, let alone diplomacy and military affairs, as he does repeatedly in July 1914: Countdown to War.
The real kicker is his Epilogue: The Question of Responsibility. First he absolves Germany and Austria on the grounds that their initial offensives (vs Belgium and Serbia) were so poorly coordinated with each other as to prove the states could not have premeditated such a war. I respond that planning can easily include bad and incomplete planning.
He then faults Germany for attacking through Belgium, and assumes that since the "Schlieffen Plan" failed to knock France out of of the war while bringing Britain in, that it could not have possibly worked. McMeekin ends his narrative on August 4th, with the commencement of hostilities. So he ignores that the key fault with the German plan of attack in 1914 is that it required France to repeat the errors of 1870 by engaging in a decisive battle too far forward. The fault is magnified by a much larger French army than in 1905, when the German plans were first drawn up. (McMeekin also entirely ignores the existence of multiple war plans.)
McMeekin doesn't stop there. At the very end, with no foundation or analysis, he asserts: "As indicated by their earlier mobilizations (especially Russia's), in 1914 France and Russia were far more eager to fight than Germany ...." To argue that the time of mobilization indicates which countries are to bear the guilt of war, requires more than mere assertion. McMeekin's story assumes that the leaders of 1914 had neither intelligence (smarts) nor intelligence (information). The leaders of Germany, France and Russia all knew that Germany could mobilize the fastest of the three, Russia the slowest. All assumed (wrongly, but unanimously) that interstate war in 1914 would move at the pace of Prussia's wars in 1864, 1866 and 1870 - and that a failure to deploy reserves would allow an opponent to deliver a knock-out blow in the opening weeks. Once war appeared inevitable, Russia had to mobilize first, given its vast size and backward (if improving) rail system. Germany's interior lines and highly efficient rail and military staff system allowed it to decide and go last. McMeekin earlier notes that the political leadership in all three countries were hesitant to declare mobilization. But in the Epilogue he only recalls the hesitations of Germany's political leaders.
Did Russia and Germany make political and diplomatic errors in July 1914. Absolutely. So did all the other European states. Did Germany have grandiose war aims? Absolutely. So did other combatants - and Japan, Serbia, France, Italy all attained much of theirs. McMeekin's account is unsatisfying, incomplete, and unsatisfactory.
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
Mosby's Rangers, by Jeffry D. Wert. pub. 1990
Book published in 1990
A concise account of one of the most renowned units of the US Civil War, and certainly the most successful partisan unit of the South. Wert argues, with amble justification in his text, that the romantic image of the Rangers, "knights, dressed in plumed hats and red-lined capes," who "rode away barely scathed" (p. 292) was "very much different" from reality. Wert concludes that while Mosby and his men "earned a place among some of the finest guerilla warriors in history," they "neither prolonged the war in (Virginia), nor had they kept thousands of Union troops away from the front." (p. 293).
In reaching this conclusion, Wert covers the actions of the Rangers in detail: who they were, individual actions, their hosts and opponents. The Rangers' targets were isolated outposts and under-guarded wagon trains - their early capture of a Union general in his bedclothes on a late winter's night was an anomaly - glorious, but not their typical fare. Like many insurgents, the Rangers struck at weak targets, using superior knowledge of the countryside to approach their target and then disperse, relying on the hospitality of locals to feed and house themselves and their mounts; the actions of the occupying army only served to encourage their hosts, until in late 1864, the Union army began to burn out the "seccesh", civilian and armed alike, by root and branch. For Mosby and his men, success or defeat would not come at their hands, but depending on whether the North tired of the conflict before gathering the strength to crush it.
Wert's comprehensive account of Mosby and the Rangers is exhaustive, almost exhausting, in its detail. A worthy addition to a Civil War bookshelf, Wert's volume neither glorifies nor detracts from Mosby's record, but sets it out cleanly and plainly.
A concise account of one of the most renowned units of the US Civil War, and certainly the most successful partisan unit of the South. Wert argues, with amble justification in his text, that the romantic image of the Rangers, "knights, dressed in plumed hats and red-lined capes," who "rode away barely scathed" (p. 292) was "very much different" from reality. Wert concludes that while Mosby and his men "earned a place among some of the finest guerilla warriors in history," they "neither prolonged the war in (Virginia), nor had they kept thousands of Union troops away from the front." (p. 293).
In reaching this conclusion, Wert covers the actions of the Rangers in detail: who they were, individual actions, their hosts and opponents. The Rangers' targets were isolated outposts and under-guarded wagon trains - their early capture of a Union general in his bedclothes on a late winter's night was an anomaly - glorious, but not their typical fare. Like many insurgents, the Rangers struck at weak targets, using superior knowledge of the countryside to approach their target and then disperse, relying on the hospitality of locals to feed and house themselves and their mounts; the actions of the occupying army only served to encourage their hosts, until in late 1864, the Union army began to burn out the "seccesh", civilian and armed alike, by root and branch. For Mosby and his men, success or defeat would not come at their hands, but depending on whether the North tired of the conflict before gathering the strength to crush it.
Wert's comprehensive account of Mosby and the Rangers is exhaustive, almost exhausting, in its detail. A worthy addition to a Civil War bookshelf, Wert's volume neither glorifies nor detracts from Mosby's record, but sets it out cleanly and plainly.
Thursday, July 24, 2014
(Some of) The Real Waste in the DoD Budget
John McCain sent me a letter on behalf of "Citizens Against Government Waste," claiming that the world's largest military is being "hollowed out" by waste. The "survey" asks which of five (piddling) expenditures I would eliminate. I'd add three others to his list: The V-22 Osprey (which costs more and crashes more than the helicopter its supposed to replace), the F-35 (ditto) - and congressional delegation (CODEL) flights on military aircraft, which cost $10,000 an hour to run and simply don't go anywhere not serviced by commercial and charter aircraft. Oh, and we have too many nukes, too - and that costs more billions.
Wednesday, July 2, 2014
Book review: Montgomery as Military Commander
Montgomery as Military Commander
Author: Ronald Lewin. For many, Montgomery is to the UK and the Royal Army what Patton is to the US and the American Army: the finest military commander in World War II. Yet, American evaluations of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery are generally dismissive, if not scathing. Lewin, who served under Montgomery in North Africa and NW Europe, appraises his former superior's service impassionately, examining both his merits and flaws.
For merits, Montgomery scores high on his ability to defeat the Germans while conserving rapidly dwindling British manpower. Clearly, Montgomery's battlefield and staff experience in World War One plays a key role here. It would have been useful, however, if Lewin had made a statistical comparison between Montgomery and other British and Allied leaders. As it is, I was left wondering if Montgomery was more parsimonious with lives than his Allied contemporaries.
Lewin also credits Montgomery with playing THE key role in restructuring Overlord, the D-Day invasion of Normandy. Lewin notes that Montgomery's predecessor as chief planner for the invasion operated under strict shipping limits, constraining the initial landing to three divisions, a limit promptly (and properly) raised to five (plus three airborne) by Montgomery. But, again a question arises: Wouldn't any commander have sought the extra divisions? The key was that Churchill listed to Montgomery, since he had won at El Alamein.
Ah, El Alamein. Lewin describes Montgomery's exacting planning to ensure the first notable British land victory against Germany in WW2, while noting Montgomery's failure to plan for the expected exploitation of the breakthrough. It doesn't appear Lewin even considered whether the battle was necessary at all, in light of the Operation Torch landings in NW North Africa which would have likely compelled Rommel's retreat in any event.
I agree with Lewin that criticism over Montgomery for the "failure" of the July 1944 Operation Goodwood, east of Caen in Normandy, is misplaced. Goodwood was designed to pin down the vast bulk of German armor, a role the Brits and Canadians had played since June 6, to free the way for Bradley and Patton's right hook - Operation Cobra. Lewin implicitly notes that Montgomery drew some of the criticism for overselling the results, however. Lewin blithely skips over Montgomery's failure to close the Falaise Gap, allowing the German Army to escape - and criticizes Patton for his eagerness to charge from the south if Montgomery won't close from the north.
The worst case of Montgomery overselling his efforts came after the Battle of the Bulge, when he took far too much credit for stopping the last German offensive in the west. A senior general in an Allied fight should watch his words. He certainly shouldn't need his Prime Minister to cover for him, or prompt his superior (Ike in this case) to start writing a letter: "Either he goes or I do."
Lewin briefly but accurately faults Montgomery for failing to clear the approaches to Antwerp and Rotterdam promptly, leaving the largest port complex in NW Europe closed to allied shipping for three months. But, foreshadowing his later argument, Lewin also spreads blame to Montgomery's boss, Ike.
Lewin is excessively apologetic, even deceptive, in blaming almost everyone else for Montgomery's most glaring mistake: Operation Market-Garden. It's Ike's fault for not diverting supplies from Patton. It's Patton fault for "stealing" supplies. It's the fault of the RAF for not dropping the 1st Airborne directly on the Rhine bridge at Arnhem. It's the 1st Airborne's commander's fault for not challenging the RAF. It's the US Army's fault, for not drawing off enough German forces from Montgomery's advance. UK XXX Corps was not handled properly. Only three actors are excused: the US 82nd and 101st airborne divisions; allied intelligence's "pardonable error" in missing TWO German panzer divisions on the drop zones (?!?) ; and Montgomery himself. Lewin calls Market-Garden "a tactical mistake" (emphasis in original). In my view, you can't, as Lewin does, credit a general for daring and dash if he wastes the efforts of his men. Market-Garden wasn't so much a tactical mistake as bad planning of a bad concept. And that lies, entirely, at Montgomery's feet.
Lewin covers Montgomery's interwar service as well, highlighting his laudable service in educating and mentoring junior officers.
In conclusion, what I draw from Lewin's useful account is that Montgomery was a fine divisional commander, would have functioned well as a battlefield corps commander (a role he never had), but was out of his depth at the Army and Army Group level. But that perhaps the UK had no one else who could have functioned even as well as Montgomery at those rarefied heights. Thankfully, we had Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton.
Author: Ronald Lewin. For many, Montgomery is to the UK and the Royal Army what Patton is to the US and the American Army: the finest military commander in World War II. Yet, American evaluations of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery are generally dismissive, if not scathing. Lewin, who served under Montgomery in North Africa and NW Europe, appraises his former superior's service impassionately, examining both his merits and flaws.
For merits, Montgomery scores high on his ability to defeat the Germans while conserving rapidly dwindling British manpower. Clearly, Montgomery's battlefield and staff experience in World War One plays a key role here. It would have been useful, however, if Lewin had made a statistical comparison between Montgomery and other British and Allied leaders. As it is, I was left wondering if Montgomery was more parsimonious with lives than his Allied contemporaries.
Lewin also credits Montgomery with playing THE key role in restructuring Overlord, the D-Day invasion of Normandy. Lewin notes that Montgomery's predecessor as chief planner for the invasion operated under strict shipping limits, constraining the initial landing to three divisions, a limit promptly (and properly) raised to five (plus three airborne) by Montgomery. But, again a question arises: Wouldn't any commander have sought the extra divisions? The key was that Churchill listed to Montgomery, since he had won at El Alamein.
Ah, El Alamein. Lewin describes Montgomery's exacting planning to ensure the first notable British land victory against Germany in WW2, while noting Montgomery's failure to plan for the expected exploitation of the breakthrough. It doesn't appear Lewin even considered whether the battle was necessary at all, in light of the Operation Torch landings in NW North Africa which would have likely compelled Rommel's retreat in any event.
I agree with Lewin that criticism over Montgomery for the "failure" of the July 1944 Operation Goodwood, east of Caen in Normandy, is misplaced. Goodwood was designed to pin down the vast bulk of German armor, a role the Brits and Canadians had played since June 6, to free the way for Bradley and Patton's right hook - Operation Cobra. Lewin implicitly notes that Montgomery drew some of the criticism for overselling the results, however. Lewin blithely skips over Montgomery's failure to close the Falaise Gap, allowing the German Army to escape - and criticizes Patton for his eagerness to charge from the south if Montgomery won't close from the north.
The worst case of Montgomery overselling his efforts came after the Battle of the Bulge, when he took far too much credit for stopping the last German offensive in the west. A senior general in an Allied fight should watch his words. He certainly shouldn't need his Prime Minister to cover for him, or prompt his superior (Ike in this case) to start writing a letter: "Either he goes or I do."
Lewin briefly but accurately faults Montgomery for failing to clear the approaches to Antwerp and Rotterdam promptly, leaving the largest port complex in NW Europe closed to allied shipping for three months. But, foreshadowing his later argument, Lewin also spreads blame to Montgomery's boss, Ike.
Lewin is excessively apologetic, even deceptive, in blaming almost everyone else for Montgomery's most glaring mistake: Operation Market-Garden. It's Ike's fault for not diverting supplies from Patton. It's Patton fault for "stealing" supplies. It's the fault of the RAF for not dropping the 1st Airborne directly on the Rhine bridge at Arnhem. It's the 1st Airborne's commander's fault for not challenging the RAF. It's the US Army's fault, for not drawing off enough German forces from Montgomery's advance. UK XXX Corps was not handled properly. Only three actors are excused: the US 82nd and 101st airborne divisions; allied intelligence's "pardonable error" in missing TWO German panzer divisions on the drop zones (?!?) ; and Montgomery himself. Lewin calls Market-Garden "a tactical mistake" (emphasis in original). In my view, you can't, as Lewin does, credit a general for daring and dash if he wastes the efforts of his men. Market-Garden wasn't so much a tactical mistake as bad planning of a bad concept. And that lies, entirely, at Montgomery's feet.
Lewin covers Montgomery's interwar service as well, highlighting his laudable service in educating and mentoring junior officers.
In conclusion, what I draw from Lewin's useful account is that Montgomery was a fine divisional commander, would have functioned well as a battlefield corps commander (a role he never had), but was out of his depth at the Army and Army Group level. But that perhaps the UK had no one else who could have functioned even as well as Montgomery at those rarefied heights. Thankfully, we had Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton.
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