Durrell was posted at the British Embassy in Belgrade from 1948 to 1952. It is from that experience that he gathered his background for White Eagles over Serbia, an entrancing realistic spy thriller from 1957 set in the time of Durrell's service in Yugoslavia. As a fellow ex-pat who served in the (former) Yugoslavia for six years, if at a later time, Durrell's narrative rings true. I wish to avoid spoilers, as this short (by current standards) tale moves briskly, alternating adventure and narrative, and should be read by any fan of Fleming, Forsyth, Le Carre, Ludlum and the like.
Thursday, July 23, 2015
Book Review: A Mad Catastrophe - The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Hapsburg Empire
Geoffrey Wawro's book is a useful addition to the literature on the outbreak of World War One. The first quarter of the book examines how Austria entered the war with such a weak force; man for man, perhaps the weakest of any combatant. Wawro argues that it was Hungarian obstinacy, facilitated by the 1867 Compromise, itself supported by Bismarck who was keen to guard against Austrian schemes of revenge for their 1866 humiliation at the hands of Prussia. Penny-pinching led to shortages of rifles, machine guns, artillery and shells, and low pay for officers, leading to mediocre leadership.
It's a convincing argument, reading the remainder of the book, as general after general, most notably the army's leader, the inept and maudlin Chief of Staff Conrad, "lead" their troops from comfortable chateaus far, far to the rear. Three (!) invasions of Serbia in 1914, which had armed the assassins of the Austrian emperor's heir, were thrown back with heavy losses on both sides. There, as against Russia, only German intervention stabilized the front.
I found the successive accounts of military debacle after debacle exhausting and repetitive. But think of those who fought in them!
I do wish that Wawro had spent more time on the "why" of Austrian decision-making, both in politics before the war and militarily after July 1914. Wawro explicates the July crisis as quickly as he can, and falls into the trap of calling the ultimatum "degrading," mischaracterizing the key point as calling for Austrian officials to "lead an inquiry (on Serbian soil)" into the assassination - the ultimatum in fact calls for the cooperation and participation of Austria in Serbian led actions. But for Wawro's book, this is a sidelight, and thus a more excusable error than in some other accounts.
The maps included are useful, and the photographs add welcome interest.
It's a convincing argument, reading the remainder of the book, as general after general, most notably the army's leader, the inept and maudlin Chief of Staff Conrad, "lead" their troops from comfortable chateaus far, far to the rear. Three (!) invasions of Serbia in 1914, which had armed the assassins of the Austrian emperor's heir, were thrown back with heavy losses on both sides. There, as against Russia, only German intervention stabilized the front.
I found the successive accounts of military debacle after debacle exhausting and repetitive. But think of those who fought in them!
I do wish that Wawro had spent more time on the "why" of Austrian decision-making, both in politics before the war and militarily after July 1914. Wawro explicates the July crisis as quickly as he can, and falls into the trap of calling the ultimatum "degrading," mischaracterizing the key point as calling for Austrian officials to "lead an inquiry (on Serbian soil)" into the assassination - the ultimatum in fact calls for the cooperation and participation of Austria in Serbian led actions. But for Wawro's book, this is a sidelight, and thus a more excusable error than in some other accounts.
The maps included are useful, and the photographs add welcome interest.
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