Book review: Montgomery as Military Commander

Montgomery as Military Commander

Author: Ronald Lewin.  For many, Montgomery is to the UK and the Royal Army what Patton is to the US and the American Army: the finest military commander in World War II. Yet, American evaluations of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery are generally dismissive, if not scathing. Lewin, who served under Montgomery in North Africa and NW Europe, appraises his former superior's service impassionately, examining both his merits and flaws.

For merits, Montgomery scores high on his ability to defeat the Germans while conserving rapidly dwindling British manpower. Clearly, Montgomery's battlefield and staff experience in World War One plays a key role here. It would have been useful, however, if Lewin had made a statistical comparison between Montgomery and other British and Allied leaders.  As it is, I was left wondering if Montgomery was more parsimonious with lives than his Allied contemporaries. 

Lewin also credits Montgomery with playing THE key role in restructuring Overlord, the D-Day invasion of Normandy. Lewin notes that Montgomery's predecessor as chief planner for the invasion operated under strict shipping limits, constraining the initial landing to three divisions, a limit promptly (and properly) raised to five (plus three airborne) by Montgomery. But, again a question arises: Wouldn't any commander have sought the extra divisions? The key was that Churchill listed to Montgomery, since he had won at El Alamein.

Ah, El Alamein. Lewin describes Montgomery's exacting planning to ensure the first notable British land victory against Germany in WW2, while noting Montgomery's failure to plan for the expected exploitation of the breakthrough.  It doesn't appear Lewin even considered whether the battle was necessary at all, in light of the Operation Torch landings in NW North Africa which would have likely compelled Rommel's retreat in any event.

I agree with Lewin that criticism over Montgomery for the "failure" of the July 1944 Operation Goodwood, east of Caen in Normandy, is misplaced. Goodwood was designed to pin down the vast bulk of German armor, a role the Brits and Canadians had played since June 6, to free the way for Bradley and Patton's right hook - Operation Cobra. Lewin implicitly notes that Montgomery drew some of the criticism for overselling the results, however. Lewin blithely skips over Montgomery's failure to close the Falaise  Gap, allowing the German Army to escape - and criticizes Patton for his eagerness to charge from the south if Montgomery won't close from the north.

The worst case of Montgomery overselling his efforts came after the Battle of the Bulge, when he took far too much credit for stopping the last German offensive in the west. A senior general in an Allied fight should watch his words. He certainly shouldn't need his Prime Minister to cover for him, or prompt his superior (Ike in this case) to start writing a letter: "Either he goes or I do."

Lewin briefly but accurately faults Montgomery for failing to clear the approaches to Antwerp and Rotterdam promptly, leaving the largest port complex in NW Europe closed to allied shipping for three months.  But, foreshadowing his later argument, Lewin also spreads blame to Montgomery's boss, Ike.

Lewin is excessively apologetic, even deceptive, in blaming almost everyone else for Montgomery's most glaring mistake: Operation Market-Garden. It's Ike's fault for not diverting supplies from Patton. It's Patton fault for "stealing" supplies. It's the fault of the RAF for not dropping the 1st Airborne directly on the Rhine bridge at Arnhem. It's the 1st Airborne's commander's fault for not challenging the RAF. It's the US Army's fault, for not drawing off enough German forces from Montgomery's advance. UK XXX Corps was not handled properly. Only three actors are excused: the US 82nd and 101st airborne divisions; allied intelligence's "pardonable error" in missing TWO German panzer divisions on the drop zones (?!?) ; and Montgomery himself.  Lewin calls Market-Garden "a tactical mistake" (emphasis in original).  In my view, you can't, as Lewin does,  credit a general for daring and dash if he wastes the efforts of his men. Market-Garden wasn't so much a tactical mistake as bad planning of a bad concept. And that lies, entirely, at Montgomery's feet.

Lewin covers Montgomery's interwar service as well, highlighting his laudable service in educating and mentoring junior officers.

In conclusion, what I draw from Lewin's useful account is that Montgomery was a fine divisional commander, would have functioned well as a battlefield corps commander (a role he never had), but was out of his depth at the Army and Army Group level.  But that perhaps the UK had no one else who could have functioned even as well as Montgomery at those rarefied heights. Thankfully, we had Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton.