Thursday, October 8, 2015

Book Review: The Dead Hand - The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy

David E. Hoffman's Dead Hand  is both well-researched and well-written - but in its focus on Gorbachev and Reagan, it lacks analysis. When faced with the question, why did  Gorbachev continue funding the hidden, and quite illegal, Soviet biological weapons program while seeking the complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, Hoffman shrugs. Hoffman never raises the question of why the Soviets hated Reagan's SDI ("Star Wars" - ballistic missile defense). Nor does it occur to Hoffman to examine what Reagan did, and could have done, to push his Administration to support his goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I don't have a good answer for the last - but Hoffman, as a political reporter, could have presumably done more on the question.

The penultimate chapter of Dead Hand hints at why the Soviets, if not Gorbachev himself, kept the biological weapons program. Namely, it becomes a war-winning weapon in the absence of opposing WMD systems, particularly if the weapons are deployed on the scale envisioned by the Soviets. Compliance with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWTC) is still, in 2015, nearly impossible to verify, given the BWTC's lack of any verification protocol. As shown by Aum Shinrikyo's 1994 and 1995 (Tokyo subway) attacks, biological weapons are comparatively easy to acquire and deliver, with research and production of the weapons easily concealed.

Conversely, Hoffman never considers why the Soviets feared a viable 
ballistic missile defense (BMD). Hoffman takes Reagan at his word, that BMD would be a passive shield. Hoffman never considers that shields and armor exist not to preserve the combatant against repeated, unreturned blows, but to enable the armored fighter to deliver a decisive attack while surviving the exchange.

Let's consider two countries, perfect reciprocals. Both have 1000 missiles with 3 nuclear warheads each. Each has 100 cities with 1 million population each; each city takes 5 warheads to destroy. Likewise, each missile is in a silo, which takes two warheads to destroy. Each missile has 95% accuracy against a city, but only 

60% against a silo. (You have to hit much closer to a hardened silo to destroy it, compared to a city.)

Without BMD, a first strike against silos leaves 100 to 200 missiles to retaliate. The retaliation essentially destroys 90% of the attacker's cities.  If the first striker has BMD to destroy that retaliation, it can strike without injury to itself. And if the BMD has to handle 100 to 200 missiles, rather than 1000, the task is simplified and the efficacy of the shield improved.

The world is safer with fewer nuclear weapons, and will be safer with even fewer still. But the last phase, from several hundred to zero, will be tricky - and much trickier than the Dead Hand would lead one to believe.

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

Book review: Chasing the Scream: The First and Last Days of the War on Drugs

Compelling. Evocative. Persuasive. Whether you are opposed to the war on drugs, fully support it, are undecided or just uninformed, it is worth your time to read this investigation in to how the war started, who its victims are, and whether it is just making things worse. Even before I read Johann Hari's recent book (published this year (2015)), I believed that drug prohibition had many of the ill effects as alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, with no better chance for success. (Crime, smuggling, corruption, police brutality, poison deaths - all with little effect on usage.)  Hari comes to the same conclusion, looking at the U.S. experience from 1914 to 2014, and at the experience of other countries, notably Switzerland, Portugal, and Uruguay, which have to varying degrees, ended the war on drugs - and seen drug abuse decline as a result.

Hari's subject is controversial, as is Hari himself (he lost his position as popular columnist over plagiarism charges, no doubt one of the reasons he is so careful to document sources in this book).

Hari humanizes his subject, and in particular its victims. Even the drug dealers, mob bosses, and cartel hitmen appear as humans, to the dismay perhaps of those seeking still to divide the world into black and white, good and evil. (Indeed, from the book it appears the only person for whom Hari has no sympathy is the late Dr. Timothy Leary.)

You need not accept Hari's thesis that addiction stems primarily from isolation to perceive that his examples of decriminalization and legalization as successfully reducing the harmful effects of drug use are, at least in their settings, valid. Or vice-versa. The War on Drugs -- Nancy Reagan's facile "Just Say No," "This your brain on drugs," DA.R.E., and harsh raids and punishments you wouldn't inflict on a rabid dog -- has failed. What was that definition of insanity?

Saturday, September 26, 2015

Book Review: Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I, by Michael S. Neiberg

Did you know:

a) most Europeans did not want a general war in 1914?
b) most Europeans did not expect the war to last more than a few weeks or at most months after it did start?
c) war causes privation, and seeing the dead and wounded from war is emotionally painful?

If your answer to all three is "yes" - skip Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I, by Michael S. Neiberg.


Monday, August 10, 2015

Atomic Bombs on Japan - Unnecessary, or Even a War Crime?

Sorry, but I utterly disagree. Full disclosure: if not for the sudden end to the war in the Pacific, unforeseeable without the use of the atomic bomb, I probably wouldn't even be writing this. My father narrowly escaped death off Okinawa, where his lightly-armed, unarmored, and highly vulnerable merchant ship was repeatedly targeted by kamikaze attacks. When the war ended, he was scheduled to return to the Pacific, where the Japanese had five times as many kamikaze attacks readied - Allied planners estimated that 1/3 to 1/2 of the invasion force could be lost before landing.

The last straw was not Soviet attacks against the Japanese army occupying Manchuria, which was not considered a core part of the Japanese Empire. Starting in 1942, most of the Japanese army in Manchuria had been transferred to fight the US; what remained was raw recruits, understrength and poorly equipped. Indeed, in his speech announcing surrender, Emperor Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings, but not once to the Soviet attack, a view he repeated to General MacArthur in September 1945.

I am at the forefront of those calling for further sharp reductions in American (and other states') nuclear weapons. I am proud to be considered a member of the US delegation that negotiated the New START Treaty, which cut the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons and their launchers for both the US and Russia. I am proud of the work I did to push for a treaty ending production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (Pakistan continues to block work on such an agreement.) . I have written both of my Senators, and my Congressman, urging them to support the P5+1 Iran deal. I have made my support for that deal very public. I even question whether US interests in the Pacific and Asia were of a such a degree as to risk provoking war with Japan (my internal jury is still out on that one). But I do not let my strong, unshakeable stance against the continued construction and possession of nuclear weapons blind me to their great utility in ending the horrors that would have ensued had World War II been prosecuted after August 1945.

Friday, August 7, 2015

Iran Deal: SEN Chuck Schumer Demands a Unicorn

Senator Chuck Schumer (D - NY) has stated he will oppose the P5+1 deal halting and rolling back efforts by Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. https://medium.com/@SenSchumer/my-position-on-the-iran-deal-e976b2f13478  Why? Well, centrally he says: "First, inspections are not “anywhere, anytime” and "Even more troubling is the fact that the U.S. cannot demand inspections unilaterally. "

That's right, Senator, Iran is not going to let foreign inspectors walk into ANY location in Iran, at ANY time, at the sole say-so and direction of its chief global opponent. What country, not prostrate after a total war, would allow that? You, sir, have asked for a unicorn. Under the deal, the IAEA inspections are extremely rigorous, more so than in any other country. Real arms control experts have said it is nearly impossible for Iran to have a nuclear weapons program under this deal. http://www.vox.com/2015/7/15/8967147/iran-nuclear-deal-jeffrey-lewis  The level of inspections demanded by Schumer are unneccessary and tantamount to granting the CIA an open door into the entire Iranian government, economy, and society. After the 1953 CIA-backed coup, the Iranians would never agree to that.

Senator Schumer's standards for the key goals under this agreement are fanciful. He might as well ask for a unicorn.

Thursday, August 6, 2015

Book Review: Dark Invasion - 1915: Germany's Secret War and the Hunt for the First Terrorist Cell in America

Well, the sub-title tells you all you need to know about the subject of the book. The title plays off that of the memoirs of one of the German saboteurs, Dark Invader. Howard Blum's tale is compelling, and reads like an action-adventure novel, only it all happened. Murder, disguise, espionage, sabotage, suicide, attempted assassination of a powerful NY banker, rebellion, war in Mexico, WMD, detective stake-outs and chases, high-level briefings of the US President - it's all here. And it's history, not fiction.

As a story, Dark Invasion is gripping. As history, this well-researched account is even more compelling. In setting out the extensive, notorious and scandalous efforts of German diplomats, agents, and disgracefully not a few dual-nationals to violently block shipments from the "neutral" US to Britain and France in their war with Germany, Blum underscores an often overlooked motivation for America's entry into the Great War - German provocations, which even President Wilson ultimately found too much to withstand.

Blum's focus on Tom Tierney, the NYPD detective trying to halt Germany's attacks on allied shipping in his home town and harbor, is an effective device.  Tierney reminded me of Jack Ryan, but I'd rather have Tierney on my side than Ryan any day.

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Book Review: White Eagles over Serbia, by Lawrence Durrell

Durrell was posted at the British Embassy in Belgrade from 1948 to 1952. It is from that experience that he gathered his background for White Eagles over Serbia, an entrancing realistic spy thriller from 1957 set in the time of Durrell's service in Yugoslavia. As a fellow ex-pat who served in the (former) Yugoslavia for six years, if at a later time, Durrell's narrative rings true. I wish to avoid spoilers, as this short (by current standards) tale moves briskly, alternating adventure and narrative, and should be read by any fan of Fleming, Forsyth, Le Carre, Ludlum and the like.


Book Review: A Mad Catastrophe - The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Hapsburg Empire

Geoffrey Wawro's book is a useful addition to the literature on the outbreak of World War One. The first quarter of the book examines how Austria entered the war with such a weak force; man for man, perhaps the weakest of any combatant. Wawro argues that it was Hungarian obstinacy, facilitated by the 1867 Compromise, itself supported by Bismarck who was keen to guard against Austrian schemes of revenge for their 1866 humiliation at the hands of Prussia. Penny-pinching led to shortages of rifles, machine guns, artillery and shells, and low pay for officers, leading to mediocre leadership.

It's a convincing argument, reading the remainder of the book, as general after general, most notably the army's leader, the inept and maudlin Chief of Staff Conrad, "lead" their troops from comfortable chateaus far, far to the rear. Three (!) invasions of Serbia in 1914, which had armed the assassins of the Austrian emperor's heir, were thrown back with heavy losses on both sides. There, as against Russia, only German intervention stabilized the front.

I found the successive accounts of military debacle after debacle exhausting and repetitive. But think of those who fought in them!

I do wish that Wawro had spent more time on the "why" of Austrian decision-making, both in politics before the war and militarily after July 1914. Wawro explicates the July crisis as quickly as he can, and falls into the trap of calling the ultimatum "degrading," mischaracterizing the key point as calling for Austrian officials to "lead an inquiry (on Serbian soil)" into the assassination - the ultimatum in fact calls for the cooperation and participation of Austria in Serbian led actions. But for Wawro's book, this is a sidelight, and thus a more excusable error than in some other accounts.

The maps included are useful, and the photographs add welcome interest.

Sunday, June 21, 2015

Book Review: The Famine Plot, by Tim Pat Coogan

"The Almighty, indeed, sent the potato blight, but the English created the Famine." 

John Mitchel, 1861. 

Mitchel was "transported" (exiled) to Bermuda for 14 years for speaking the truth. Tim Pat Coogan will suffer no such fate for writing: "The Famine Plot; England's Role in Ireland's Greatest Tragedy." In America, he will suffer worse: the vast majority will never hear of, let alone read, his book. Of those of who do, almost all will view it as either a tale of "Olde Tyme Irelande" or as a political critique of, and only pertaining to, early Victorian England.

Coogan makes a well-researched, well-argued case for Mitchel's aphorism. Moreover, the faults of London's politicians and bureaucrats persist today, whenever government exploits tragedy to advance narrow, ideological, and partisan goals at the expense of ordinary citizens and in favor of the wealthy elite. It is a case history that Coogan's book can best assist our understanding of present day political culture.

The English Government, particularly after Russell succeeded Peel as Prime Minister in June 1847, put forward a number of reasons why it would not relieve Ireland's distress - even though Ireland, de jure, was an integral part of the so-called United Kingdom. I will summarize Coogan's arguments, which he includes as part of his chronological assessment, instead by topics.


Capitalism

Most Irish farmers were tenants, farming plots rented from often absentee landlords. Those landlords believed (often rightly) that they could receive more money if the small farms were extinguished, and the land use for "big farming" - cattle and export crops. The famine, though death and emigration, accomplished their goals.


Laissez faire economics


Prime Russel's Whigs were great proponents of laissez faire economics and the philosophies of Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus. So much so, they opposed food assistance as it would lower the price received by merchants. Nor was thought given to retaining food in Ireland - food exports continued in accordance with "sacrosanct" contracts. When at last public work programs were put in place, the roads were built in wildernesses -- "Boithre an ocrais (roads of hunger)" (p. 109), to not give private road builders competition.

Opposition to Government Welfare

Only with great reluctance did Russell's government provide welfare, and usually only under limited and demeaning circumstances, namely the infamous Dickensian workhouses.  Coogan cites England's senior bureaucrat (Trevelyan) as asserting that any wages paid for public works should be lower the prevailing wage, and only enough to keep away starvation. (p. 108) Recipients of welfare were to be destitute, devoid of even the smallest plot of land on which subsistence could be made. The governing philosophy was that poor relief (welfare) must be "penal and repulsive" - Treveleyan again. (p. 117), ignoring the overcrowded and diseased conditions of the workhouse that prevailed in reality. Instead, the Whigs and their favorite newspaper, The Times (of London) imagined as late as 1848, after a million Irish had died or emigrated in "coffin ships" that the Irish "are sitting idle at home, basking in the sun, telling stories, going to fairs, plotting, rebelling, wishing death to the Saxon," all born "on the shoulders of the hard working" Englishman (p. 213).

Racism

Coogan does not spare his readers the racist epithets of the English leadership, wherein such lights of the Victorian age as Disraeli, Punch magazine, and many others lesser known to an American audience compared the Irish to apes and rats. In a passage reminiscent of W's "they hate our freedoms," Disraeli proclaimed, "The Irish hate our order, our civilization, our enterprising industry, our pure religion." (p. 57)

Austerity

Coogan underscores as well the objection of HMG to relief on the grounds of government expense. It is somewhat difficult to parse from Coogan what would have been the expense of a responsive plan, one that would have spared the Irish from the famine. It appears, however, to be on the scale of 15 million pounds - roughly the UK's annual defense budget, or 1/4th the total financial cost to the UK of its wholly unnecessary and thoroughly unproductive prosecution of the Crimean war ten years after the Famine.

Conclusion

There is much, much more in Coogan's magnificent book, and I whole-heartedly recommend to anyone interested in Irish history, English politics, or political behavior and philosophy in general.





Monday, June 1, 2015

Book Review: The Lost History of 1914

Jack Beatty has taken a hard look at the "inevitability" of World War One, and deftly refuted the argument. The core of his book is the first six chapters, each looking at one of the major combatant countries and how close each came to NOT entering onto military action in Europe in 1914 (or 1917). The six are Germany, Russia, England, United States, Austria-Hungary, and France.  

The most interesting arguments are those on England, the US, and France. As any serious scholar of England knows, until the very last days of July 1914, it looked far more likely that the British Expeditionary Force would go to Ireland, as civil war broke out between Protestants and Catholics over Home Rule, than to France in the wake of Germany's attack through Belgium. 

If not for a nationalist editor publishing scandalous but true accounts of the skirt-chasing Minister of Finance, Joseph Callaux, Mme Callaux would have no cause to shoot and kill the newspaperman - derailing her husband's otherwise easy electoral victory and appointment as Prime Minister. With the renowned Jean Jaures as his foreign minister, and Callaux's track record of successfully mollifying German demands, it is unlikely that war on the western front would have broken out.

The most fascinating chapter is on the US, as Beatty underscores the anti-imperialist stance of President Wilson, and his break with the Taft policy of supporting Mexico's dictator, the favorite of Wall Street. Beatty shows how Wilson's motives in landing troops in Veracruz, Mexico in April 1914 was to support the rebels, by blocking arm shipments to the president of Mexico - but the fact of American troops on Mexican soil was portrayed as renewed imperialism. Provoked by Villa's 1916 raid on Columbus, NM, Wilson sent General Pershing on a wild-goose chase after the rebel formerly supported by Wilson. The renewed presence of American troops on Mexican soil prompted closer ties between Mexico and Imperial Germany, culminating in the disastrous Zimmermann telegram of 1917, promising Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to be restored to Mexico. Beatty argues that the telegram was even more decisive than the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare against American merchant ships in generating a fever for war in the heartland.

There is much more in Beatty's book; I have not even touched on the last four chapters, covering the last months of 1914, as the spade replaces the machine gun as the key instrument of war.  Beatty's book is well-written, and well worth the time and attention of anyone interested in how the war could have been avoided.

Monday, May 18, 2015

McCain's BFF Running for President

So, Sen. Lindsey Graham has announced that he will announce on June 1 "whether" he is running for President. On the one hand, as a (up until now anyway) lifelong bachelor, he would be only the second such to enter the Oval Office. OOTH, ... yech.

He says that he is running for the office because "he's been more right than wrong on foreign policy." Really? Because he also said the 2003 Iraq war was the result of "faulty intelligence ... but (with) faulty intelligence the entire world believed." Right. That's why we renamed Freedom fries French fries, to honor our Gallic allies in the 2003 invasion. The solid, nay unanimous UN Security Council vote for a resolution authorizing military action. Ambassador Wilson alerting us all to Iraq's purchases of uranium ore ("yellowcake"). Hans Blix coming back from Iraq and assuring us all that Saddam is just weeks away from having a nuke. The Department of Energy and State's Intelligence and Research (INR) agencies guaranteeing that the aluminum tubes were for centrifuges, not conventional military items. Top US General Shinseki stating that a small force would be ok, we "would be welcomed as liberators."  Oh, right. NONE OF THAT HAPPENED. Rather, just the opposite. 

Graham, a lawyer and USAF JAG, has also recently proclaimed in Iowa that, "If I'm President of the United States and you're thinkin' about joining al-Qaeda or ISIL -- anybody thinkin' about that -- I'm not going to call a judge, I'm going to call a drone and we will kill you." Which further demonstrates his firm grasp on the rule of law and reality.  Or not.

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article21166422.html#storylink=cpy

Thursday, May 7, 2015

Class Immobility

The Atlantic Monthly posed an interesting article online, "The Best Way to Nab Your Dream Job Out of College? Be Born Rich." When I worked for the State Department, I hired a number of interns. With a very short-time frame for hiring decisions, the application was decisive. For me, unlike those in article, "school prestige" didn't cut it at all - which school the applicant attended was the LAST thing I looked at. I ignored extra-curricular activities like "rock-climbing" and "lacrosse;" an extra-curricular activity related to the position for they applied was very valuable, however. I also tried very hard to ignore gender. What I did look at was why they wanted to intern with my office, and whether their essay was well-written, because the jobs always included a LOT of writing.

Tuesday, May 5, 2015

Book Review: Profiles in Folly - History's Worst Decisions and Why They Went Wrong

Alan Axelrod's breezy and quick-reading book from 2008 covers 35 of the "worst decisions" in history, often in wartime, from 1250 BC (the Trojan horse) to 2005 (Hurricane Katrina). (The decisions are very Euro-centric.) As Axelrod himself notes, this is not "objective history," a balanced look at why decisions were made. He is particularly (if justifiably) hard on the Bush-Cheney administration, which gets tarred four times (space shuttle, Iraq war (twice), hurricane Katrina), with a glancing blow from Enron as well. 

Axelrod formats his stories well into six parts, each entitled "The Decision to _________." Specifically: Gamble and Hope; Manipulate; Leap (Without Looking); Retreat; Destroy; and Drift. While most of the stories are familiar, Axelrod's ability to cut away extraneous matter makes each a strong example of the section's theme, and reinforces the role of obstinance, stupidity, cupidity and ignorance in bad decision-making. 

I would only take exception to one account, that of Austria's decision to present its ultimatum to Serbia in 1914. Largely, I see the faulty account by Axelrod as rooted in his use of the very popular, but erroneous, Guns of August (by Barbara Tuchman), as one of only two sources.  Consequently, the severity of the ultimatum is over-stated.

I look forward to reading more of Axelrod's many books.


Book Review: Warrior Race - A History of the British at War

I should have guessed from the back cover: "telling anecdote," "storyteller," "lively anecdote," "entertaining," "anecdotes are wonderful," "personal vignettes." Yep, despite its subtitle, this is not a history, which requires thematic analysis, but a compilation of stories. General Wolfe's capture of Quebec in 1759 is here not important for its decisive effect on North American and world history, but because of the maudlin, "inspiring," portrait of his death at the climax of the battle. Similarly, Trafalgar is not the decisive check to Napoleon, but the source material for an "heroic" depiction of Admiral Nelson dying on, and at the point of, Victory. Bernard Montgomery does not figure at all for his role as the quintessential leader of Britain's armies in World War 2, but for wrongly guessing as a lieutenant in 1914 that the war would be quick and decisive.  

Author Lawrence James switches his focus back and forth as he brushes his own picture of the effect of war on Britain since Roman times. The result is several books between two covers. England's interference in Ireland is reasonably well-covered, but India gets scant coverage and Africa almost none. The RAF's continued desire for upper class officers as "natural leaders" is noted, but no discussion is made of how British officers interacted with so-called "native" troops, e.g., Indians or Africans. We do get a lot on the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the presence of barflies and camp-followers (i.e., "amateur" prostitutes) in 1940-45 UK - but not the camp-follower's experience.

The inside dustcover states James' subject as: "the question of British national identity and character." Close. I'd say English rather than British. This is a book for the Anglophile, narrowly cast, who is already well read in the chronology and history of England's wars, campaigns, battles and leaders, who wants the steady succession of vignettes from on low presented here.

Thursday, March 12, 2015

And it only cost $3.27...

Well, that was fun. Or, "fun." And only took two hours. Yesterday I vacuumed out Tessa's Rav4, and afterwards she noticed that the center floor console gearshift light wouldn't light. Me: "There's a light?" Confirm that there is, remove the huge piece of plastic (which can only be done with the car in gear!), figure out how to remove the teeny LED bulb. Clearly burned out - filament is open, bulb is slightly darkened. Take it to the autoparts store, where they helpfully can't find the bulb. I find it, buy a package of two - because you have to buy two of a unique light, when the last one lasted 17 years and 190,000 miles, install the bulb, and before putting everything back, check to see if it lights.
It doesn't.
Mess around on the interwebs some more, when a tangential article gives me a "A-ha!" moment. Maybe the headlights have to be on. Yep. Reverse the above, taking out a pathetic aftermarket bracket the PO put in.
In very bright daylight I can't tell it still works, but heck - I've got a spare! (?!?) And I don't think I snapped anything.
Oh, and I found $1.98 under the console in the process.

Wednesday, February 4, 2015

Book review: Capital in the Twenty-First Century, by Thomas Piketty.


Piketty makes an exhaustive case for his argument that the return on capital has historically and consistently been significantly higher than the rate of growth in the economy and that, unchecked, this will lead to greater and greater concentrations of private wealth at upper 1/10th (decile) and 1/100th (centile) of society. At 655 pages (including the extensive and substantive endnotes), it is an exhausting study as well. His focus on Europe, while natural for a French economist, will put off many American readers who have not followed the turmoil and foibles of the Eurozone since 2008. In the end, Piketty's solution, a global (or at least widely-based) progressive tax on capital strikes me as both effective and politically impossible.

As someone who lived in a tax haven for a number of years, and examined the paucity of the nominal returns on capital hidden away there, I was most delighted by the passage on pages 521-2, where Piketty notes that bank secrecy is most plausibly explained by the haven's share in the illicit gains when its clients exploit the secrecy to avoid their fiscal obligations. Piketty calls this “outright theft.” I would compare the tax havens of the 21st century to the pirate havens of the 17th century – profiting at their neighbor's expense, while contributing nothing of value.


Capital is one of the most important books of 2014, but a condensed version would be more accessible, while still conveying the salient points that have contributed to a wider discussion of income inequality.

Tuesday, February 3, 2015

Transient Gems

Minneapolis got 2 inches (5 cm) of light, fluffy snow this afternoon. Now, under the streetlights and full moon, it is as if every surface was dusted with a thousand small fairy gems, with shimmers and reflections. Added bonus: the snow squeaks underfoot!

Tuesday, January 20, 2015

History without Analysis

The Month That Changed the World: July 1914, by Gordon Martel. 2014.

Gordon Martel, in his The Month That Changed the World: July 1914, has set out a chronological narrative of the actions taken by European government officials, largely those in the foreign ministries of the Great Powers, in the last week of prior to the outbreak of the Great War. In a sense, Martel's book is Luigi Albertini (The Origins of the War of 1914) writ small. Martel avoids assigning guilt for the war, and eschews judging the decisions of his characters. In his last chapter, he castigates those historians who explore the "what ifs" of 1914, decisions that if made differently may have avoided war.

Martel's book strikes me as incomplete. In focusing on the senior foreign ministry officials and heads of state, he gives the impression that foreign policy is made in a vacuum occupied solely by those gentlemen. More serious is his exclusion of any serious investigation of why Vienna persisted in its assumption that Russia would not take military action against Austria-Hungary, right up through Russian mobilization and Germany's declaration of war against Russia (even before Vienna had so declared).  A key figure in that blindness is the Austrian military Chief of Staff Conrad. Perhaps as Conrad is not a diplomat, Martel figured he was not part of his thesis.

The biggest weakness is the book's lack of analysis, of judgment. Martel has written another book, The Origins of the First World War (1987), and perhaps that book would be more satisfactory. As it is, The Month That Changed the World: July 1914 feels like research notes, carefully arranged in chronological order.

I do recommend Clark's  The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.