So, Sen. Lindsey Graham has announced that he will announce on June 1 "whether" he is running for President. On the one hand, as a (up until now anyway) lifelong bachelor, he would be only the second such to enter the Oval Office. OOTH, ... yech.
He says that he is running for the office because "he's been more right than wrong on foreign policy." Really? Because he also said the 2003 Iraq war was the result of "faulty intelligence ... but (with) faulty intelligence the entire world believed." Right. That's why we renamed Freedom fries French fries, to honor our Gallic allies in the 2003 invasion. The solid, nay unanimous UN Security Council vote for a resolution authorizing military action. Ambassador Wilson alerting us all to Iraq's purchases of uranium ore ("yellowcake"). Hans Blix coming back from Iraq and assuring us all that Saddam is just weeks away from having a nuke. The Department of Energy and State's Intelligence and Research (INR) agencies guaranteeing that the aluminum tubes were for centrifuges, not conventional military items. Top US General Shinseki stating that a small force would be ok, we "would be welcomed as liberators." Oh, right. NONE OF THAT HAPPENED. Rather, just the opposite.
Graham, a lawyer and USAF JAG, has also recently proclaimed in Iowa that, "If I'm President of the United States and you're thinkin' about joining al-Qaeda or ISIL -- anybody thinkin' about that -- I'm not going to call a judge, I'm going to call a drone and we will kill you." Which further demonstrates his firm grasp on the rule of law and reality. Or not.
Monday, May 18, 2015
Thursday, May 7, 2015
Class Immobility
The Atlantic Monthly posed an interesting article online, "The Best Way to Nab Your Dream Job Out of College? Be Born Rich." When I worked for the State Department, I hired a number of interns. With a very short-time frame for hiring decisions, the application was decisive. For me, unlike those in article, "school prestige" didn't cut it at all - which school the applicant attended was the LAST thing I looked at. I ignored extra-curricular activities like "rock-climbing" and "lacrosse;" an extra-curricular activity related to the position for they applied was very valuable, however. I also tried very hard to ignore gender. What I did look at was why they wanted to intern with my office, and whether their essay was well-written, because the jobs always included a LOT of writing.
Tuesday, May 5, 2015
Book Review: Profiles in Folly - History's Worst Decisions and Why They Went Wrong
Alan Axelrod's breezy and quick-reading book from 2008 covers 35 of the "worst decisions" in history, often in wartime, from 1250 BC (the Trojan horse) to 2005 (Hurricane Katrina). (The decisions are very Euro-centric.) As Axelrod himself notes, this is not "objective history," a balanced look at why decisions were made. He is particularly (if justifiably) hard on the Bush-Cheney administration, which gets tarred four times (space shuttle, Iraq war (twice), hurricane Katrina), with a glancing blow from Enron as well.
Axelrod formats his stories well into six parts, each entitled "The Decision to _________." Specifically: Gamble and Hope; Manipulate; Leap (Without Looking); Retreat; Destroy; and Drift. While most of the stories are familiar, Axelrod's ability to cut away extraneous matter makes each a strong example of the section's theme, and reinforces the role of obstinance, stupidity, cupidity and ignorance in bad decision-making.
I would only take exception to one account, that of Austria's decision to present its ultimatum to Serbia in 1914. Largely, I see the faulty account by Axelrod as rooted in his use of the very popular, but erroneous, Guns of August (by Barbara Tuchman), as one of only two sources. Consequently, the severity of the ultimatum is over-stated.
I look forward to reading more of Axelrod's many books.
Axelrod formats his stories well into six parts, each entitled "The Decision to _________." Specifically: Gamble and Hope; Manipulate; Leap (Without Looking); Retreat; Destroy; and Drift. While most of the stories are familiar, Axelrod's ability to cut away extraneous matter makes each a strong example of the section's theme, and reinforces the role of obstinance, stupidity, cupidity and ignorance in bad decision-making.
I would only take exception to one account, that of Austria's decision to present its ultimatum to Serbia in 1914. Largely, I see the faulty account by Axelrod as rooted in his use of the very popular, but erroneous, Guns of August (by Barbara Tuchman), as one of only two sources. Consequently, the severity of the ultimatum is over-stated.
I look forward to reading more of Axelrod's many books.
Book Review: Warrior Race - A History of the British at War
I should have guessed from the back cover: "telling anecdote," "storyteller," "lively anecdote," "entertaining," "anecdotes are wonderful," "personal vignettes." Yep, despite its subtitle, this is not a history, which requires thematic analysis, but a compilation of stories. General Wolfe's capture of Quebec in 1759 is here not important for its decisive effect on North American and world history, but because of the maudlin, "inspiring," portrait of his death at the climax of the battle. Similarly, Trafalgar is not the decisive check to Napoleon, but the source material for an "heroic" depiction of Admiral Nelson dying on, and at the point of, Victory. Bernard Montgomery does not figure at all for his role as the quintessential leader of Britain's armies in World War 2, but for wrongly guessing as a lieutenant in 1914 that the war would be quick and decisive.
Author Lawrence James switches his focus back and forth as he brushes his own picture of the effect of war on Britain since Roman times. The result is several books between two covers. England's interference in Ireland is reasonably well-covered, but India gets scant coverage and Africa almost none. The RAF's continued desire for upper class officers as "natural leaders" is noted, but no discussion is made of how British officers interacted with so-called "native" troops, e.g., Indians or Africans. We do get a lot on the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the presence of barflies and camp-followers (i.e., "amateur" prostitutes) in 1940-45 UK - but not the camp-follower's experience.
The inside dustcover states James' subject as: "the question of British national identity and character." Close. I'd say English rather than British. This is a book for the Anglophile, narrowly cast, who is already well read in the chronology and history of England's wars, campaigns, battles and leaders, who wants the steady succession of vignettes from on low presented here.
Author Lawrence James switches his focus back and forth as he brushes his own picture of the effect of war on Britain since Roman times. The result is several books between two covers. England's interference in Ireland is reasonably well-covered, but India gets scant coverage and Africa almost none. The RAF's continued desire for upper class officers as "natural leaders" is noted, but no discussion is made of how British officers interacted with so-called "native" troops, e.g., Indians or Africans. We do get a lot on the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the presence of barflies and camp-followers (i.e., "amateur" prostitutes) in 1940-45 UK - but not the camp-follower's experience.
The inside dustcover states James' subject as: "the question of British national identity and character." Close. I'd say English rather than British. This is a book for the Anglophile, narrowly cast, who is already well read in the chronology and history of England's wars, campaigns, battles and leaders, who wants the steady succession of vignettes from on low presented here.
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