From Bad to Simply Awful and Tendentious: No Simple Victory - World War II in Europe, 1939-1945, by Norman Davies

Lately, I've taken to reading the end of novels first, to see how the author reaches her conclusions. If only I had done that with Davies' 500 page No Simple Victory. I could have then tossed it aside as the tendentious work it is hours earlier, without wasting my time.

Nominally, Davies sets out to give a synthetic view of WW2 in Europe, and not focus simply on the efforts of the US and UK militaries. But the small and large factual errors pile up (see below), all under an assertion that the Soviet effort was so "overwhelming" as to completely overshadow the Western effort. Frankly, any book on WW2 Europe that dismissively asserts that "D-Day does not figure among the top ten battles of the war" is seriously in error.

How does Davies figure the significance of battles? By counting up the number of military deaths, primarily, secondarily by counting the number of divisions, and lastly by assigning a duration to the battle. All of which, perhaps accidently but more likely by surreptitious intention, assigns more weight to the inefficient way of battle practiced by the Soviet Army, which created and destroyed (understrength) divisions by the hundreds, as compared to the West, which created a few score divisions, each quite powerful on its own and generally overstrength, not just compared to a Soviet division (which it would overawe, one on one), but even compared to its "authorized" strength, if measured just prior to a campaign.

To Davies' way of thought, a battle between 300,000 men on both sides that kills half of each force over two months is far more significant than a battle between the same forces, where the victor loses only 5,000 men in a week of fighting to vanquish its foe, which loses 20,000 dead and 200,000 captured. In fact, it would be either 150,000 divided by 25,000 = six times more significant; or it is eight times more significant (300,000 men each force x two forces x two months = 1,200,000 "man-months) cf. 300,000 men each force x two forces x 1/4 month = 150,000 man-months). Yet in the real world the first is a bloody stalemate, the second a brilliant victory.

Or look at Davies' list of battles and campaigns (p. 25): of the top four battles, two (Barbarossa and Kiev 1941) were won by the strategic loser (Germany), and a third (Leningrad) was a stalemate - and in Davies' own assessment, a fight that Soviets should have declined by withdrawing from the city.

Another notable error is Davies' assertion (page 109) that the Axis "cut its losses" in Tunisia in 1943. German military dead in North Africa in 1943 were slight (c. 8,500), so Davies' method would have this as insignificant. Never mind the surrender of over 200,000 Axis troops ( 12/ German) - more than surrendered at Stalingrad. Never mind the loss of 40% of the Luftwaffe (11/42 - 5/43, in N. Africa and the Med).  The small errors are too numerous to recapitulate (one sticks too hard not to mention: B-24s were built by Consolidated, not North American).

I'm not sure what Davies' goal was in writing NSV. But given his reputation as a fervent advocate for Poland (he was made a Polish citizen on the basis of his prior work), I believe he wants to fault his homeland, the UK, for failing in its September goal of restoring Poland's freedom within its 1939 borders.

Measure Three Times?

My garage installer told me of a guy who had ordered a garage door that he'd put in himself. Said he wanted a 17' by 9' door. Installer wondered about that, said almost all doors are 16' by 8' - and that seventeen feet wide (5.2m) was particularly unheard of. Guy insisted he had measured it three times - 17 feet.

So they delivered it, and it was clearly too big - and no easy way to cut a metal door down. Guy pulls out his measuring tape. Installer notices it has been repaired. Guy says, yeah, the end broke off, so I cut off a foot and reattached it. Installer replies, yeah, and you forgot to subtract that foot when you measured for the new door.

Book Review: The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain's Rush to War 1914, by Douglas Newton

Newton delivers a solid piece of historical research, exploding the myths of why, how, and importantly when Britain decided on war in 1914. The classic myth is that Britain only decided on war AFTER Germany invaded “plucky little” Belgium on August 4th, declaring war late that evening. Newton shows that the very senior members of Britain's government, acting without Parliament or even the larger Cabinet, decided on war August 2^nd, in support of the “Ententes” with Russia and France, themselves designed not to constrain Germany, but to de-conflict the British Empire's colonial holdings in Africa and Asia.

In this account, PM Asquith, Foreign Minister Grey, and First Sea Lord Churchill controlled the descent into war. Only Asquith's motivation is explored in depth, stressing his desire to keep his Liberal government in power. (Ironically, a coalition with the Conservatives was unavoidable in May 1915, resulting from poor management of the war.)

Newton also all too briefly sketches the nascent opposition to war, nipped in the bud by the heavy-handed rush to war.

Newton's writing style is solid but academic, and the book is not a”page-turner.” It is however a useful counter to the “fairy tale” of Britain being forced into war by “dire necessity.” At the least, any reader interested in the origins of World War One should read Newton's last two paragraphs, Radical Recriminations, and Conclusion,where he gives an excellent summary of his arguments.

The US Supreme Court and Historical Nonsense

There's a lot of blather (particularly from Cruz and Rubio, but also McConnell and other supposed "conservatives") about there being "precedent" and "tradition" on not appointing/confirming Supreme Court justices in a presidential election year. The fact is, a vacancy just doesn't occur very often; most justices retire or resign, and they've chosen to leave when a president they like is in office, and not in a presidential election year.

Let's use the 80 year time frame put forth by Rubio: 1936-2016. Thirty justices chose to step down; ten died in office. Probability says two (and half) should have died in a year evenly divisible by four. In fact, Scalia is the first SC justice to DIE IN A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR IN 80 YEARS.

Ok, Rubio, Cruz, et al.: it's not precedent or tradition if it JUST HASN'T HAPPENED BEFORE.

Book Review: An Unsatisfying Account of the Naval Battles off Guadalcanal in 1942

Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal. James D. Hornfischer.

I really wanted to like this book. I enjoyed immensely Hornfischer's The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, a gripping account of the succesful defiance shown by the smallest warships of the US Navy when faced with a devasting surface attack led by the warship in the world, the Japanese battleship Yamato, off Leyte Gulf in October 1944. But Hornfischer's technique of showing the reactions of sailors and officers to the confusion and terror of battle in one encounter doesn't work that well when applied to an entire months-long campaign, with seven major battles and near-continous skirmishes. In reading Neptune's Inferno, I repeatedly lost track of individuals and even entire ships - and I have read numerous accounts of these events before. A novice to naval warfare would be even more lost, as Hornfischer ignores technology in favor of personalities - except when he doesn't, with unexplicated references to "turret 1" and such.

There are disconcerting editing mistakes as well: Two examples, page 283: "at murderously close range, sixty-two thousand yards,..." No, that's 35 miles; should be “hundred yards.” Page 284: "Bruce McCandless at the flagship's (San Francisco) conn called to Captain Jenkins, "The Atlanta's turning left. Should I follow her?" Really? Because Jenkins is captain of the Atlanta - how and why would McCandless on the San Francisco's bridge call out to him?

I know I am outlier here, but Neptune's Inferno's narrative left me confused, its exposition of events was superficial, and its analysis was simply missing in all the action. For example, Hornficher properly notes that the anti-aircraft cruiser USS Atlanta was sent to join a surface action group, while the US battleships were retained on carrier and escort convoy duty - a perfect mismatch of roles and capabilities - but does little to explicate this command error.

I will go back to Samuel E. Morison's official history The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942-February 1943 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II) , Eric Hammels' Decision at Sea and Carrier Strike, and Osprey Publishing's The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942: Clash for Supremacy in the Pacific (Campaign).

Battlefield Diplomacy

Book Review: The Dead Hand - The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy

David E. Hoffman's Dead Hand  is both well-researched and well-written - but in its focus on Gorbachev and Reagan, it lacks analysis. When faced with the question, why did  Gorbachev continue funding the hidden, and quite illegal, Soviet biological weapons program while seeking the complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, Hoffman shrugs. Hoffman never raises the question of why the Soviets hated Reagan's SDI ("Star Wars" - ballistic missile defense). Nor does it occur to Hoffman to examine what Reagan did, and could have done, to push his Administration to support his goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I don't have a good answer for the last - but Hoffman, as a political reporter, could have presumably done more on the question.

The penultimate chapter of Dead Hand hints at why the Soviets, if not Gorbachev himself, kept the biological weapons program. Namely, it becomes a war-winning weapon in the absence of opposing WMD systems, particularly if the weapons are deployed on the scale envisioned by the Soviets. Compliance with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWTC) is still, in 2015, nearly impossible to verify, given the BWTC's lack of any verification protocol. As shown by Aum Shinrikyo's 1994 and 1995 (Tokyo subway) attacks, biological weapons are comparatively easy to acquire and deliver, with research and production of the weapons easily concealed.

Conversely, Hoffman never considers why the Soviets feared a viable ballistic missile defense (BMD). Hoffman takes Reagan at his word, that BMD would be a passive shield. Hoffman never considers that shields and armor exist not to preserve the combatant against repeated, unreturned blows, but to enable the armored fighter to deliver a decisive attack while surviving the exchange.

Let's consider two countries, perfect reciprocals. Both have 1000 missiles with 3 nuclear warheads each. Each has 100 cities with 1 million population each; each city takes 5 warheads to destroy. Likewise, each missile is in a silo, which takes two warheads to destroy. Each missile has 95% accuracy against a city, but only 
60% against a silo. (You have to hit much closer to a hardened silo to destroy it, compared to a city.)

Without BMD, a first strike against silos leaves 100 to 200 missiles to retaliate. The retaliation essentially destroys 90% of the attacker's cities.  If the first striker has BMD to destroy that retaliation, it can strike without injury to itself. And if the BMD has to handle 100 to 200 missiles, rather than 1000, the task is simplified and the efficacy of the shield improved.

The world is safer with fewer nuclear weapons, and will be safer with even fewer still. But the last phase, from several hundred to zero, will be tricky - and much trickier than the Dead Hand would lead one to believe.