Neptune's
Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal. James
D. Hornfischer.
I really wanted to like this book. I enjoyed immensely Hornfischer's The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, a gripping account of the succesful defiance shown by the smallest warships of the US Navy when faced with a devasting surface attack led by the warship in the world, the Japanese battleship Yamato, off Leyte Gulf in October 1944. But Hornfischer's technique of showing the reactions of sailors and officers to the confusion and terror of battle in one encounter doesn't work that well when applied to an entire months-long campaign, with seven major battles and near-continous skirmishes. In reading Neptune's Inferno, I repeatedly lost track of individuals and even entire ships - and I have read numerous accounts of these events before. A novice to naval warfare would be even more lost, as Hornfischer ignores technology in favor of personalities - except when he doesn't, with unexplicated references to "turret 1" and such.
There are disconcerting editing mistakes as well: Two examples, page 283: "at murderously close range, sixty-two thousand yards,..." No, that's 35 miles; should be “hundred yards.” Page 284: "Bruce McCandless at the flagship's (San Francisco) conn called to Captain Jenkins, "The Atlanta's turning left. Should I follow her?" Really? Because Jenkins is captain of the Atlanta - how and why would McCandless on the San Francisco's bridge call out to him?
I know I am outlier here, but Neptune's Inferno's narrative left me confused, its exposition of events was superficial, and its analysis was simply missing in all the action. For example, Hornficher properly notes that the anti-aircraft cruiser USS Atlanta was sent to join a surface action group, while the US battleships were retained on carrier and escort convoy duty - a perfect mismatch of roles and capabilities - but does little to explicate this command error.
I will go back to Samuel E. Morison's official history The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942-February 1943 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II) , Eric Hammels' Decision at Sea and Carrier Strike, and Osprey Publishing's The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942: Clash for Supremacy in the Pacific (Campaign).
I really wanted to like this book. I enjoyed immensely Hornfischer's The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors, a gripping account of the succesful defiance shown by the smallest warships of the US Navy when faced with a devasting surface attack led by the warship in the world, the Japanese battleship Yamato, off Leyte Gulf in October 1944. But Hornfischer's technique of showing the reactions of sailors and officers to the confusion and terror of battle in one encounter doesn't work that well when applied to an entire months-long campaign, with seven major battles and near-continous skirmishes. In reading Neptune's Inferno, I repeatedly lost track of individuals and even entire ships - and I have read numerous accounts of these events before. A novice to naval warfare would be even more lost, as Hornfischer ignores technology in favor of personalities - except when he doesn't, with unexplicated references to "turret 1" and such.
There are disconcerting editing mistakes as well: Two examples, page 283: "at murderously close range, sixty-two thousand yards,..." No, that's 35 miles; should be “hundred yards.” Page 284: "Bruce McCandless at the flagship's (San Francisco) conn called to Captain Jenkins, "The Atlanta's turning left. Should I follow her?" Really? Because Jenkins is captain of the Atlanta - how and why would McCandless on the San Francisco's bridge call out to him?
I know I am outlier here, but Neptune's Inferno's narrative left me confused, its exposition of events was superficial, and its analysis was simply missing in all the action. For example, Hornficher properly notes that the anti-aircraft cruiser USS Atlanta was sent to join a surface action group, while the US battleships were retained on carrier and escort convoy duty - a perfect mismatch of roles and capabilities - but does little to explicate this command error.
I will go back to Samuel E. Morison's official history The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942-February 1943 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II) , Eric Hammels' Decision at Sea and Carrier Strike, and Osprey Publishing's The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942: Clash for Supremacy in the Pacific (Campaign).
